| Cas | e 08-45257 Doc 176 Filed 03/24/09 Entered 03/24/09 10:08:45 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 53 |
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| 1   | UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  |
| 2   | DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA   |
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| 4   | In Re: BKY No: 08-45257   |
| 5   | Petters Company, Inc., et al.,  |
| 6   | Debtors.  |
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| 9   | BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY F. KISHEL  |
| 10  | United States Bankruptcy Judge  |
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| 12  |   |
| 13  | * * *   |
| 14  | TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS   |
| 15  | 1/22/09   |
| 16  | * * *   |
| 17  |   |
| 18  | Proceedings recorded by electronic sound  |
| 19  | recording, transcript prepared by transcription service.                                    |
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| 22  | NEIL K. JOHNSON REPORTING AGENCY  |
| 23  | Six West 5th Street, Suite 700 St. Paul, MN 55102   |
| 24  | LISA M. THORSGAARD, RPR   |
| 25  |   |
|     |   |

## PROCEEDINGS

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been set for 2:00 on request of the movant's counsel combined with a request for expedited relief pursuant to the local rules. This is a motion by certain creditors in one or more of the cases jointly administered under case file 08-45257, Petters Company, Inc., that motion being fundamentally one to compel discovery responses. We are in open court. There's one appearance by telephone.

I'm going to ask counsel to note their appearances for the record.

MR. JORISSEN: Good afternoon,
Your Honor. James Jorissen on behalf of
Ritchie Capital.

MR. LODOEN: Your Honor, James Lodoen an behalf of Doug Kelley and also with me is Sandra Smalley.

MR. RIDGWAY: Good afternoon,
Your Honor. Mike Ridgway and Robert Raschke
for the United States Trustee.

THE COURT: All right.

25 Additionally appearing by telephone is Thomas

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Mr. Jorissen asked this morning whether

Mr. Cauley could participate by telephone. He

was instructed that I will not be hearing

5 argument from Mr. Cauley by telephone but that

he could sit in.

And, Mr. Cauley, you are still there?

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MR. CAULEY: I am here.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Jorissen, I'll hear from you. And let me just touch on one thing before I forget about The moving documents are wrongly captioned. Comply with the order for joint administration in these cases the same as every other party does. Those documents were generated out of Sidley and Austin. We're not captioning them Chicago style and New York style here. I want all the names of the debtors to appear in the captions of these jointly administered cases because we may have proceedings popping in from any individual case all coming in under one file, and it always helps me anyway, memory not being any better with age, to know exactly which parties this may entail. So next time around those

and set a deadline for any responses that might be filed related to any objections. We served an objection on January 7, and on January 9 Ritchie served interrogatories, documents requests, and a notice of deposition on Mr. Kelley's counsel, Mr. Lodoen, at Lindquist & Vennum. We included in the written discovery a return date of January 21 of 2009.

And the cover letter that I sent to

Mr. Lodoen with the materials that we served,

we served them by e-mail and by mail, asked

Mr. Lodoen to follow up with me with respect

to Mr. Kelley's willingness to comply with a

shortened notice period given the hearing date

that had been set by the Court. And as we

detailed in the motion on January 13 of 2009,

Mr. Lodoen attempted to respond to me by

e-mail and apparently spelled my last name

incorrectly and the e-mail did not get to me,

nor apparently did it bounce back to

Mr. Lodoen.

In the e-mail that Mr. Lodoen had attempted to send, he had indicated that the Trustee did not intend to comply with the

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discovery requests or the shortened notice period. Not having heard from Mr. Lodoen later on in the week, I put a call in to him and I left a message on his voice mail inquiring about the status of the discovery and their positions related to the discovery. And on January 16 of 2009 I received a call from Ms. Smalley-Fleming, Mr. Lodoen's partner. And during that conversation, Your Honor, she indicated that Mr. Lodoen had tried to contact me about this. During the call she also indicated that Mr. Kelley would not be responding to our discovery on an expedited basis or otherwise and she gave me the reasons why Mr. Kelley did not feel obliged to do so. I asked her to put those reasons in writing and she obliged my request and late in the afternoon on January 16 of 2009, I received a letter from Ms. Smalley-Fleming outlining the reasons why Mr. Kelley would not be responding to our discovery requests.

And really, the basic reasons expressed in the letter were threefold. One, your order setting the hearing and the procedures for the hearing did not provide for an evidentiary

hearing nor did it provide explicitly for discovery and we didn't -- I didn't ask for discovery or an evidentiary hearing during the December hearing that preceded the issuance of your order.

The letter also expressed the view that Judge Montgomery's December 8 order in the receivership proceeding bars us from taking the discovery we would like to take from Mr. Kelley in his capacity as Trustee in these proceedings.

And finally, the letter indicated that the verified statement that was submitted with Mr. Kelley's appointment, as well as publicly available information, would provide all the information needed to determine the issue in play at the January 27, 2009 hearing which is Mr. Kelley's disinterest in this.

Now, in their response to our motion

Mr. Kelley has asserted that because Rule 2009

does not provide for discovery, parties

objecting to the appointment of a trustee are

not entitled to take discovery. And the

argument appears to be, Your Honor, that

Rule 2009 contains exhaustive procedures for

objecting or opposing the appointment of a particular trustee in a jointly administered case.

The rule itself doesn't contain any procedural provisions related to an objection to the appointment of a trustee. All the rule really says about process is set forth in Rule 2009(d). And Rule 2009(d) says that the court shall order appointment of separate trustees, quote, on a showing that creditors or equity security holders will be prejudiced by conflicts of interest of a common trustee who has been elected or appointed.

So the rule itself doesn't contemplate how the showing will be made. And in the regular course the way that you would object would be to file a motion objecting to the appointment, and the filing of that motion would, in turn, under Rule 9014 kick into effect the discovery procedures available under Part 7 of the rules.

And in this case, Your Honor, the process is a little bit different because in your order you had indicated that if Ritchie continued to object to the trustee who was

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ultimately appointed by the United States

Trustee, that those objections should be made
in the way of objections and that's what we
did.

Now, in this context the objection is the functional equivalent of a motion. we're contesting the appointment of the -- of Mr. Kelley as trustee through our objection, and we believe that under these circumstances, the discovery provisions of part 7 do apply and are available to allow us to examine Mr. Kelley on issues that are germane to his fitness to serve as trustee in these jointly administered cases; namely, whether he has conflicts of interest given the directives contained in Judge Montgomery's order in the receivership case, among other things, and given the divergent interest that we believe exists between the creditors of PGW and the creditors of PCI in these cases.

The first time that I got any sense that they were taking the position that these discovery requests are overbroad is when I read their memorandum this morning. And I understand that this hearing was scheduled

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late. They had to get a response together quickly. But in any case, the first time anyone said anything to me about overbreadth was in -- or nobody said anything to me about overbreadth. The first time I heard about it was in the motion.

Now, we did indicate expressly in the correspondence that we served with our discovery that we would work with Mr. Kelley and his counsel to try to focus the discovery to facilitate getting it done in time to be ready to go by the hearing date. And we're not, I don't think, Your Honor, in front of you today seeking to compel discovery. We're seeking to expedite discovery. We've received no responses or objections to the discovery that we've served, and at this point we don't have any concrete specific objections to any particular category of our discovery that we can sit down and negotiate with Mr. Kelley and his counsel to try and narrow to appease their concerns that we're maybe trying to get into information that isn't germane to what we're trying to figure out and the information that we think is germane to the decision that Your

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Honor will have to make ultimately relative to our objection.

We do think that the discovery that we've served is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. the requests that we made go to areas of potential conflicts which arise from the multiple roles that Mr. Kelley currently serves in and has served in throughout the duration of his involvement with, first, the receivership and then these Chapter 11 cases, and we've outlined what we think some of those pertinent areas are. His representation of PGW and PCI and Mr. Petters prior to becoming receiver. His work with the United States Attorney related to forfeiture, related to piercing the veil, related to analyzing transactions between PCI and PGW and other entities in these cases. And we think those all go to the issues that are going to be presented at this hearing, potential bias, potential lack of disinterestedness, and potentially having prejudged some of the issues that you'll be called and he will be called on to tackle as trustee.

Now, Mr. Kelley's contention that
there's no legal authority to take discovery
from a trustee I think is just wrong.
Trustees submit to discovery all the time. My
partner is a panel trustee in this district.
He submits to discovery. He's been deposed.
And the cases that they cite to support the
premise that a trustee can't be subject to
discovery don't fit with what's going on here.

The Tri-State Ethanol case that they cite prevented discovery because the court found in that case that the record had been completely developed by the parties and that allowing further inquiry would just create more bad feelings among the parties.

The Discovery Zone case allowed discovery to proceed and the court in dicta noted that the request was considered to be unusual because of the statutory duties of a trustee, the fiduciary duties trustees owe to creditors. And it's precisely because we do not believe that Mr. Kelley in view of his obligations to the district court, to the United States Attorney and as the trustee of estates who have competing claims can fulfill

those obligations. And we think that discovery into the extent to which he has formed opinions which might work to prejudice of one creditor body in one case or another is germane to the question of whether he's disinterested.

So we believe not only is the discovery that we've asked for something that we should be able to get under the rules, but we believe that the discovery will be useful in helping the Court to understand whether Mr. Kelley has conflicts of interest which would prevent him from acting in a fiduciary capacity as trustee in these jointly administered proceedings.

Now, we are willing, Your Honor, to work with Mr. Kelley and his counsel to narrow the focus if they believe that the requests are overly broad or if they tell us that some category or another is unduly burdensome or irrelevant. We're willing to work with them on that. We're willing to talk to them about that. We expressed that willingness when we sent the discovery out.

And we're also willing and would encourage a postponement of the hearing if

appointed as a trustee or as a receiver over the PGW and PCI cases. They have sought to intervene in the district court proceedings and were denied that request and now are continuing to try to wrestle away the ongoing operations of these proceedings as well.

The discovery requests that we received just in terms of timing came in at about 6:00 on a Friday night. And I attempted to respond, as Mr. Jorissen said, on Tuesday and sent to the wrong e-mail address. He called and left a message on Friday morning. We got back to him sometime in that Friday or Ms. Smalley did on my behalf and then got a letter to him that day. So that's just the chronology of the time line. We ended up having a couple days slippage as a result of the improper e-mail address.

But we are here before the Court today and it's our position that the information being requested by the Ritchie Group is certainly -- it's discovery which was not contemplated by this Court's order and ruling in terms of how we would proceed with objections in this case. We don't believe

it's authorized by the rules but,

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nevertheless, even if it is and even if the Court contemplated possible discovery, it's certainly irrelevant, duplicative, and overly broad. We simply need to look at a few of the interrogatories and we get a real sense as to what's being asked for. And Mr. Kelley objects to all of the requests because it's all irrelevant information that is otherwise available.

Interrogatory one, state any and all actions you have taken as a receiver for Petters Group Worldwide and PGW subsidiaries. Number two, state any and all actions you have taken as a receiver for Petters Company. Number three, identify the date and persons participated and describe the substance of all of your communications with the United States Attorney with respect to Petters and the various entities. Identify all of your communications with all creditors of PGW, the PGW subsidiaries, PCI and the PCI subsidiaries, United States Trustee, Houlihan and any representatives or agents of Polaroid Corporation. Interrogatory number five,

describe and identify any analysis of actual or potential claims or actions by or against PGW, PGW subsidiaries, all of the entities.

Number six, identify and describe what you have done to investigate and your future plans for investigation of the fraud allegedly perpetrated by Petters and his accomplices.

It continues on and asks any analysis or consideration of forfeiture claims.

Identify, describe, and state the conclusions of all of your analysis or considerations with respect to the various entities and your various legal theories that you might pursue including veil piercing, single business enterprise, alter ego, or any other legal theory. And it goes on and on and on like that.

These are clearly, clearly over the top requests for discovery and actually it's discovery that's being requested of a trustee who has not even yet been formally -- well, approved by this Court. They've been appointed by the U.S. Trustee's office but this Court has issued no order appointing Mr. Kelley as trustee and, quite frankly, it's

1 unclear in what capacity he is at the moment.

He's been recommended and appointed but not

yet approved by this Court. So I'm not,

frankly, quite sure whether he is a trustee or

It seems to be in limbo.

not at the moment.

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Your Honor, the information that's relevant to whether Mr. Kelley ought to be the trustee in these cases, which, by the way, the U.S. Trustee's Office has recommended, they've consulted with, as they identified in their appointing documents, with various other creditors, each of whom approved of Mr. Kelley and indicated that the only objecting creditor they had was the Ritchie Group. Ritchie Group suggested they're different, that they loaned to PGW. Well, every one of their dollars went into PCI just like all the other creditors. And in fact, in their allegations they've -in their complaint in Illinois they've identified in numerous places where they allege that they've been defrauded just like everyone else. So, in essence, they're really not different than the other creditors in these cases. Perhaps defrauded in a little bit different way according to their

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representations but, nevertheless, make the same allegations of fraud that various other creditors do.

But what is available here in order for the Court to determine whether Mr. Kelley ought to be appointed are these documents all available in the public record. Mr. Kelley has a six-page verified statement which he filed with the United States Trustee's Office and was filed with this Court. He has a 12-page first report of receiver filed with Judge Montgomery in terms of his ongoing obligations to keep her informed and apprised of the various receivership proceedings and what he is doing. There is a 21-page order from judge Kelley -- or excuse me, from Judge Montgomery that is appointing him as the receiver that sets forth his duties, obligations, requirements, et cetera. have bankruptcy schedules filed in the various ten cases that are affiliated with PGW and PCI, all scheduling and listing the intercompany claims between the various creditor entities as best as that information is available.

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There is plenty of information that's out there that's already available and we submit that there is nothing more that is germane to the issue of whether Mr. Kelley can serve as the receiver in these ten proceedings or as a receiver over some -- excuse me. As a trustee in these ten proceedings or as the trustee over some lesser number of them.

If the Court, is at the moment, unclear as to whether ongoing discovery is appropriate or not, we would submit that the best way to proceed would be to hold the hearing on Tuesday. The Court could determine at that time whether any additional information is necessary or available for the Court to address the issue as to whether Mr. Kelley should be the trustee in these cases. And at that point in time the Court concludes that additional discovery or facts are relevant or necessary, the Court could continue that hearing and set forth some type of a guidance with respect to discovery at that point in time. Hopefully any such guidance would provide for a much narrowed scope of what's being asked both in terms of the

interrogatories, the requests for production of documents, and the request to depose Mr. Kelley.

For the good of all of these entities and the good of the creditors who are -- you know, the creditors, the victims, whatever you want to call them of Petters enterprises, we submit that it's time to stop this obstructionist nonsense and allow the cases to go forward, allow the ongoing investigations of the assets to proceed, allow the various causes of action to be pursued and allow everyone to get back to the business at hand of figuring out where did the money go, who are the creditors, and where do you go to try to recover some of that money for those creditors.

So, Your Honor, we'd respectfully request that the motion to expedite discovery be denied. And we'd also ask the Court provide that the discovery should not proceed and that we can proceed with the hearing on Tuesday based upon the record that's already available before the Court or that can be before the Court based upon the public

trustee designee or a trustee elect, if you will, and as such, he's kind of sitting in a position of limbo, not really being authorized by the Court to go forward with all the powers and obligations the Bankruptcy Code contemplates under Section 1106, and in that regard, the office of the United States

Trustee, as it does in all of these Chapter 11 cases, make sure that they are conducted expeditiously, orderly, and in an efficient manner.

I guess it's troubling that based upon the reasons we brought our motion in the first place seeking to nominate a trustee under 1104 is kind of being sidelined in a manner of speaking that we're here doing all these little side show things which distracts from the overall importance of what it is we're all about, getting somebody on board because it's our argument and it has been our position since day one that his receivership by virtue of Judge Montgomery's order terminated by operation of law and that as the trustee designee or in the event the Court approves it, as the trustee, he is authorized to go

forward to carry on the business at hand under 1106 as trustee of the bankruptcy estates, not receiver. As such, he is duty bound under Title 11. And that's clearly set forth in Judge Montgomery's order by virtue of the second amended order which was entered, I believe, December 8. And that's getting into some of the argument that we will be prepared to discuss on Tuesday.

I guess the question that the United
States Trustee has is what specific
information does Ritchie Group need in order
to advance its position on Tuesday that it
doesn't already have. We know that they're
saying that they should have their own trustee
appointed for PGW. And they seem to be saying
also that Douglas Kelley, in any event, should
be disqualified from serving in any capacity
for any of these bankruptcy entities.

That being said, the discovery that we have reviewed does seem to be asking for a lot more stuff that goes beyond the parameters of what it would be that is necessary for them to advance their position to say that, A, he's not disinterested or has an actual conflict

that prejudices them or that he's disinterested period.

We would respectfully ask that in the event the Court does grant some discovery, that it be very, very narrowly limited and in any event, to allow the already scheduled proceeding on the 27th to go forward so that we can deal with this question of limbo.

Mr. Kelley needs to get bonded and it's doubtful that any bonding company is going to issue a bond without any requisite court approving his appointment as the trustee.

Again, it makes for a very tenuous situation and the office of the United States Trustee as an overseer of the process appears here today to say look, this has to be done expeditiously and in an orderly fashion. And the unnecessary expense I would postulate in having debtor's counsel and Kelley coming in here to defend all of these other side shows doesn't do any good for any of the creditors out there and most of them are going to be unsecured creditors.

And I guess we'll leave for another day whether or not Ritchie Group is an unsecured

the fact remains fees are being generated and, we would submit, unnecessarily generated. We would ask that the Court severely limit discovery or deny it altogether, but in any event, to allow the proceeding on the 27th to go forward so the Court can listen to the arguments and make a decision as to whether or not Mr. Kelley should be approved. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, one more round here, Mr. Jorissen. Do you have anything else you want to add?

MR. JORISSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'll be very brief. The universe of information that is available regarding Mr. Kelley's activities spans a four-month period. And we are interested in knowing if he has made commitments relative to forfeiture, relative to consolidation, if he has prejudged those issues, if he has determined at this point in time that he is going to be taking a position that may be prejudicial to the creditors of PGW or PCI. His pre-receivership relationships, do those

you need to postpone the hearing. We're proposed to try to work with Mr. Kelley and Mr. Lodoen to pare these things down to a manageable level so that we get the information that we want and think is germane and they don't have to do all kinds of extra work that they think is unnecessary.

But we -- we didn't file this
bankruptcy case and the bankruptcy court and
the rules apply and the response that we got
when we served our discovery wasn't well,
you're too broad or this is unreasonable. The
response that we got was we don't have to
respond to this because of the receivership
order in the district court. And we think
that the rules of bankruptcy procedure apply
in this case and we think that we're entitled
in a contested proceeding to take discovery.

And as I indicated, we're perfectly willing to try and get all the stuff done before the hearing on the 27th. I'll sit down all day with Mr. Lodoen or whoever and go over this stuff and figure out what we can agree on and get it done.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JORISSEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Lodoen, anything else?

MR. LODOEN: Your Honor, this whole forfeiture issue at this point is really a red herring. It's not Mr. Kelley who makes a decision whether to forfeit. It is the United States Trustee's Office -- or excuse me, United States Attorney's Office --

THE COURT: Careful. You're outside of the -- you're the other side of the fence when you're talking about forfeiture.

MR. LODOEN: The United States Attorney's Office who makes that particular decision. And if they raise that issue and they pursue it, there are plenty of parties who will be involved in the proceedings who can resist it. Mr. Kelley will also be the trustee of the bankruptcy estate and will be in a position to deal with that as well.

It's been my experience or at least my understanding in some prior cases that these things are discussed and dealt with in some type of a reason basis. To date as a receiver Mr. Kelley has been paying creditors from

certain of the particular entities where assets have been liquidated, paying the trade creditors, and that has been okay with Judge Montgomery and presumably with the U.S.

Attorney's Office as well. So to reach the conclusion that we're just automatically going to have everything forfeited here is not a fair conclusion to be reaching.

And furthermore, for Ritchie to suggest that if that happens, they're unique from everybody else is certainly not an assumption that is appropriate at this point as well.

That will all be dealt with in due course.

Montgomery issued provides that Mr. Kelley is the sole agent of the district court for purposes of his role as the receiver of those entities. He has accountability directly to the Court. He has been taking that accountability seriously. He's been providing information to the Court. He's been providing a report to the Court that talks about his investigations, his activities, what he's doing, his various assets that he's been collecting, how things are going, et cetera.

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And his verified statement before this Court explains what his role was as he was involved during that week prior to ultimately being appointed as a receiver. I believe he had one moment of or one or two moments of communication with Mr. Petters in the first day or two and basically was somebody that the United States Attorney's Office was comfortable having there in a position of holding things together until everybody figured out what was going to be happening. His verified statement provides that his authority was certainly in question, that he didn't take any, you know, major acts or engage in any major -- I can't remember the words he used exactly but basically, you know, managerial type actions but basically was just holding things together until it was figured out what would happen. And much of that week, in fact, was spent with dealing with phone calls and meeting with Mr. Procida who came up here and was wanting to take over control of the company because he was the receiver appointed from the Cook County District Court in Illinois.

So, Your Honor, that is a red herring.

Certainly Judge Montgomery reached the conclusion that she was comfortable with him being a receiver over all those entities based upon her understanding of what limited involvement or role he had during the few days prior to him being appointed. The United States Attorney's Office is not troubled by that. The United States Trustee's Office is not troubled by that. And that information is all disclosed in the reports that are available.

So again, Your Honor, I'm not interested in spending the next three days spending time on this when other matters surrounding all of this warrants more of my attention. I know Mr. Kelley would not be interested in doing that either. But, you know, we'll do whatever the Court directs. But we believe this is just a burdensome expensive exercise that's being pursued by the Ritchie Group and there is no merit to proceeding with the discovery. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

(651) 681-8550 phone 1-877-681-8550 toll free

Mr. Ridgway, was there anything you wanted to

I'm going to ask the parties to come back in half an hour, twenty after three, and I'm going to give you a decision then.

Unfortunately, I can't tell you to go downstairs and get a quick cup of coffee. We could do that in Minneapolis. We cannot do that here without food service in the building other than machine service which I'll let you make your own decision as to the quality thereof, but it's going to take me about half

So I will be back out at twenty after three courtroom clock time and I'll give you a decision then. All right. We're in recess.

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an hour here.

(A break was had in the proceedings)

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THE COURT: I have reviewed such things as the latest iteration of Judge Montgomery's order for appointment of a receiver Section 1104(d), Rule 2009(d), definitional provisions of Section 101.14 as well here. I'm not prepared at this point to adopt the position that Mr. Kelley and the debtors are advancing that is the broadest which is to say discovery simply isn't available in this kind of proceeding, and it's not necessary to go that far here to deny the motion which I'm going to. Thought I'd jump right to the chase on that one and then give you the basis of my decision in the first instance.

Discovery here is sought going to a very, very broad range of matters, actions, statuses, performances of various sorts all centering around Mr. Kelley in his role as receiver appointed by the U.S. District Court. Ultimately, I am left to conclude that given the nature of the issue that's before me as I construe the issues raised by the Ritchie

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Group's objection, the subject matter for the proposed discovery really is not relevant to the issues under the governing law and is not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Now, I will say that when I first reviewed the motion and then the response this morning, the motion yesterday and yesterday evening again and the response this morning and then again just before the hearing, I mean, I was a little annoyed by what seemed to be a fairly dismissive tone that Mr. Lodoen had used in responding to Mr. Jorissen's entreaties to do something to work with them. Among other things, you know, Mr. Lodoen simply refused under what he would I'm sure characterize as color of the U.S. District Court's appointment of Mr. Kelley, refused to submit Mr. Kelley to any form of discovery at I did skim over the order for all. appointment of a receiver and was unable to find any provision that went specifically to it other than something that was actually probably all-encompassing which was the grant of judicial immunity to Mr. Kelley and that is

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probably the source of that basis for refusal.

2 My initial take on Mr. Lodoen's 3 statement to Mr. Jorissen that, number one, 4 the hearing on January 27th wasn't contemplated for the taking of evidence; 5 number two, it wasn't really a "contested 6 7 matter" or "contested proceeding" so as to 8 trigger the right to discovery under 9 Rule 9014. And that in any event, Judge 10 Kishel clearly saw the issues as being ones of 11 law alone. I thought all those are maybe a little presumptive. Frankly, I don't remember 12 13 saying anything very pointed at all at the original hearing. I may have put some 14 15 characterization on what I saw the issues as, 16 at that point, as relatively unformed as they 17 were since the issues really weren't in play. 18 The Ritchie Group had made a shot across the bow already both in writing and in oral 19 20 argument but nothing was really brought into 21 So any attempt to characterize 22 whatever I said as sort of tracking the 23 inquiry at that point a month ago or so was a 24 little presumptive.

However, in the last instance, now that

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we get right down to the pinches here in having to focus in on whether discovery is appropriate requires me to get back into what the nature of the issues are. And I quess I can see maybe where Mr. Lodoen may have derived his inference as to my perception of the issues. I think he was probably acting a little in advance of my thought process. Ultimately here the factual dimension of what's going to be aired next Tuesday is not dramatic, quite frankly. Despite some of the rhetorical hyperbole and I think the rhetorical presumptiveness of a lot of phrasing of the Ritchie Group's briefing, there's a lot of very conclusory accusations of disabling conflicts there without really having the goods for them and want to seek the goods after the fact by way of discovery.

But ultimately the issues as they are framed up by the objection to the appointment are twofold here. They both basically are an allegation that Mr. Kelley, if appointed as trustee, and if appointed and court approved to act as trustee for all of the estates in all of these cases would have divided

loyalties. The phrase conflict of interest is kind of thrown around too much and unfortunately it's passed out into the public lexicon where it has far more a connotative than a denotative meaning. So I hesitate to use the phrase conflict of interest. But what we're talking about here is an accusation of actual division of loyalties.

As the Ritchie Group frames it up, this would be twofold because of the dual status that Mr. Kelley would have or if viewed from the broad scope of a four to five month history would have had in succession as to the various Petters entities. The first one would be a conflict arising out of the duties and loyalties that he has in his status as receiver versus those duties and loyalties he would have as a status of trustee in a Chapter 11 case.

The second, then, would be the allegation of conflict of interest as among as a common trustee over several different bankruptcy estates in cases that were related and in cases of entities that were related among one another and that had acted jointly

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or in consort, at the behest, at the direction and through the manipulation of Tom Petters prepetition in a way that had so intermingled their financial affairs, their assets, their finances, their transactions and so forth that there would be cross running allegiances. Because, of course, in bankruptcy a trustee in bankruptcy, number one, has a fiduciary obligation as steward of the estate in the case that the trustee is appointed for, the trustee is obligated to gather in assets, liquidate them, recover avoidable transfers, and then, in turn, to administer the results of liquid value in a way that's consonant with the prioritization of claims under the Bankruptcy Code and also honors the right of recovery that any particular creditor had as against that prepetition debtor.

That's kind of the issue here because, of course, as soon as you have related entities in bankruptcy that have been operated without respect to corporate formalities as to which there's been comingling of assets, intercompany transfers and the like, one of the possible remedies that the code makes

1 available is so-called substantive

2 consolidation of the estates. In other words,

3 bringing all of the assets of all the debtors

4 together and then bringing all of the claims

5 together as if it were all one entity's debt

and asset structure and distributing in

7 accordance.

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This is one of the things that apparently really scares the Ritchie Group.

And, you know, I mean it's -- Mr. Lodoen has said that's one of the possibilities that's contemplated here that would be invoked if warranted. And at this point I think the emphasis has to be on if warranted.

I will say that I'm literally about four months shy of my 25th anniversary of my appointment to the Bench and I'm not sure I've ever ordered substantive consolidation of bankruptcy estates. I don't know that it's been done any more than one or two times in that 25 years in this district. The showing is pretty stiff. And there are a lot of factors that have to be used in connection with it.

There's also a lot of due process

entailed with the imposition of the remedy because everybody should be given the right to oppose it and everybody will be. In any event, those are the two conflicts that are alleged here.

Well, it's my conclusion here and I guess this ends up sort of ratifying the theory of the response that Mr. Lodoen made to Mr. Jorissen that it's only a ratification after the fact. I'm not going to say I really had this formed thought in my observations that I may have made a month ago.

As to the first alleged division of loyalties, the existence or nonexistence of any division of loyalties between Mr. Petters' status as receiver appointed by the district court for a fairly specific purpose as set forth in Judge Montgomery's order's can be gleaned from the face of that order. He has a charge to the district court there. He has to perform certain functions. And then, of course, there's that provision in term 6 down on page 16 and 17 of Judge Montgomery's order obligating him to "Coordinate with representatives of the United States

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Attorney's Office and court personnel as needed to ensure that any assets subject to the terms of this order are available for criminal restitution, forfeiture, or other legal remedies and proceedings commenced by or on behalf of the United States."

The question of whether that charge, that obligation to the district court imposes an allegiance on him that conflicts with the allegiances that he will have as trustee to the estate in any particular case in the Petters group of cases can be determined as a matter of law based upon the facial recitations throughout Judge Montgomery's order and the legal obligations he will have as fiduciary if approved and fully empowered over the estates in these cases. I think this goes back to Section 101.14, the definition of disinterested person which, of course, he has to be in order to be appointed and then fully empowered under Section 1104(d).

And Section 101.14 defines

disinterestedness in relevant part under

Section 101.14(c) as, "Does not have an

interest materially adverse to the interest of

the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in the debtor or for any other reason."

Well, the nature of his direct or indirect relationship to or connection with these debtors is going to be measured by the terms of that order. It's all determinable as a matter of law. And he doesn't have any interest in the debtors per se and he's not a shareholder. He's not a creditor. So it's all going to come back to a matter of law to be gauged from the face of the order versus the requirements that would be imposed upon him by the Bankruptcy Code.

The second allegation of divided loyalty would be one allegedly stemming from the conflicting interests as among the estates that would be an administration by him going forward at the same time. Rule 2009(d) is really sort of the reference point for the determination of relevance there. I think Rule 2009(d) which was obviously -- it was, of course, drafted by the Committee on Rules of

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Bankruptcy Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States which includes a few bankruptcy judges and at least one practitioner and some Article III judges, people kind of know the lay of the land in this area, there's a recognition there that, of course, if cases are going to be in joint administration and a single trustee is to be appointed for the reasons that otherwise merit administration by a single trustee, economy having only one person have to get up to speed on any complex of history, structure, transactions and so forth as opposed to multiple trustees dealing with the same subject matter duplicating transactional costs, reducing distributions to creditors, that sort of consideration is what militates in favor of appointing a common trustee for different estates.

There, of course, is obvious

recognition here that, you know, if you got

related entities, there may well be conflicts

of interest as between these estates,

competing claims to the same assets, cross

running claims between the debtors because

they created liabilities between them, because they created liabilities between them or whatever. So there's a recognition there that the mere existence of conflicts of interest in the abstract is not enough really to bar across the board the appointment of a common trustee for several different related -- for several different estates arising out of related cases.

The question is whether creditors of the different estates "will be prejudiced" by conflicts of interest of a common trustee who has been appointed. That's something that also can be measured by the content of statements in schedules and other documents that are available of public record. It's much more an abstract issue of law than it is as a matter of fact.

Now, the interesting things about

Rule 2009(d) is that, you know, there's no

specific time line, no deadline for the

bringing of such a motion, and if an active

conflict were to emerge later as a result of a

trustee's performance, the issue can be raised

again. There's in my mind sort of a lower

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threshold or higher threshold I should say for a disqualification or the order of a trustee from one or more of related cases and the direction to appoint a separate trustee for separate estates. We'll see what comes forward and what can be alleged when we get to the hearing next Tuesday.

I'm also just going to point out the fact, and this is no secret and I'm not telling anybody anything that I haven't already said on the record because I specifically remember interrupting Mr. Jorissen and remarking to him that the whole process of administration of bankruptcy estates, as dependent as it is on court approval for finality and enforceability of the trustee's acts and administration, is loaded, some people may say overloaded, with opportunities to prevent actual prejudice. That's one of those considerations, the mere existence of, that is another check. another stop gap as the process goes forward against the possibility of compromised allegiances which is sort of what we're all about here.

Ultimately, however, I have to conclude that really the factual matter that the Ritchie Group seeks to burrow into by way of this really very broad, and I'm going to characterize it, it is overbroad, is way too broad even if it's only limited to four months in scope, the factual matter that the Ritchie Group wants to burrow into by way of discovery does not go to facts that are relevant to the issues that I have to be concerned with next Tuesday that's not calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.

So, therefore, there isn't any basis for the discovery in the first instance here. So I'm certainly not going to either order the expediting of the responses nor am I going to delay the hearing. I'm going to address the issues as have been framed and as I have further defined them in my analysis when we reconvene next Tuesday for the formal hearing on the motion on the record as it stands and addressing these questions as matters of law.

Ultimately, the rhetorical tone of both the Ritchie Group's objection and certainly this discovery motion is that there's some

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kind of conspiracy out there or there could be and we really should be allowed to get into it. Mr. Kelley's presently accountable to the United States District Court. He has an awful lot more to lose by violating the trust that Judge Montgomery has put in him than he would have to gain by conflicted allegiances.

If we are talking about the issue of the looming omnipresence of the possibility of forfeiture by the United States, we'll get into that issue under that term 6 of Judge Montgomery's order and just what legally his position is in that whole process next Tuesday. Nothing has been brought forward by way of public pronouncement by Mr. Kelley through Mr. Lodoen or otherwise, to my knowledge, that says that he's working in consort with the United States of America to ensure that the United States grabs it all after it's brought back in. There's nothing that can prevent the government from going forward on that. Whether it will is another question entirely and it's still far too early in these cases, let alone the development of all of the Petters related legal proceedings,

to draw any conclusions about anything in relation to what the government intends.

I'm going to make a side observation that forfeiture would pluck or could pluck conceivably assets away from these bankruptcy estates whether a separate trustee is appointed or not. Whatever due process there is in the forfeiture process will be made available in the district court. That too is a consideration. So I'm going to deny the motion.

Now, in terms of any abstract obligation to respond in any other fashion, timely or otherwise, and I -- the response that Mr. Kelley put in here in conclusion just requests the Court deny the motion for expedited discovery which I'm doing. I'm not going to order any expedited responses here.

I don't know that I can read into

Mr. Kelley's response that he's asking me just
to terminate the discovery process in its
entirety. I'm going to move forward with the
January 27 hearing. That is the other request
here but I'm not going to consider on
January 27 the prospect of allowing further

Mr. Jorissen, do you have anything you

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right.

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|-----|---|----|
| 1   | want to note?   |    |
| 2   | MR. JORISSEN: No, Your Honor.   |    |
| 3   | I would just reiterate what we had said   |    |
| 4   | earlier.  |    |
| 5   | THE COURT: Okay. All right.   |    |
| 6   | I'm going to grant that motion. I'm just  |    |
| 7   | going to quash the discovery process. This is   |    |
| 8   | just going to be put at an end and there will   |    |
| 9   | be no overhanging issue of whether Mr. Kelley   |    |
| 10  | or these debtors have any continuing  |    |
| 11  | obligation to respond in kind to those  |    |
| 12  | discovery requests. They will not.  |    |
| 13  | So I'll see that the order provides   |    |
| 14  | that accordingly. All right. Good enough.   |    |
| 15  | Anything else? All right. That should take  |    |
| 16  | care of it. Stand adjourned.  |    |
| 17  | MR. JORISSEN: Thank you, Your   |    |
| 18  | Honor.  |    |
| 19  | MR. LODOEN: Thank you, Your   |    |
| 20  | Honor.  |    |
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    STATE OF MINNESOTA
                          ) ss.
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    COUNTY OF WASHINGTON)
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              BE IT KNOWN, that I transcribed the
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              IN EVIDENCE HEREOF, WITNESS MY HAND.
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                          s:/ Lisa M. Thorsgaard
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