1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
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4	In Re:
5	Petters Company, Inc., et.al.
6	Case No. 08-45257
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9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY F. KISHEL
10	United States Bankruptcy Judge
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12	* * *
13	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
14	January 27, 2009
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18	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript prepared by transcription service.
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21	NEIL K. JOHNSON REPORTING AGENCY
22	Six West 5th Street, Suite 700 Saint Paul, Minnesota 55102
23	LESLIE R. PINGLEY
24	
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1 APPEARANCES 2 3 4 MR. JAMES A. LODOEN, Attorney at Law, 80 5 South Eighth Street, Suite 4200, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 appeared on behalf of Debtors. 6 7 8 9 MR. MICHAEL E. RIDGWAY and MR. ROBERT RASCHKE, U.S. Trustee's Office, 300 South Fourth 10 11 Street, Suite 1015, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415 12 appeared as U.S. Trustees. 13 14 MR. JAMES M. JORISSEN and MR. BRIAN 15 16 KRAKAUER, Attorneys at Law, 100 South Fifth Street, 17 Suite 2500, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 appeared on 18 behalf of Ritchie Special Credit Investments, Ltd., 19 Rhone Holdings II, Ltd., Yorkville Investment I, LLC, 20 Ritchie Capital Structure Arbitrage Trading, Ltd., and 21 Ritchie Capital Management, Ltd. 22 23

1	APPEARANCES (CONT'D)
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4	MR. DAVID E. RUNCK, Attorney at Law,
5	775 Prairie Center Drive, Suite 400, Eden Prairie,
6	Minnesota 55344 appeared on behalf of the Unsecured
7	Creditor's Committee.
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10	Also present: Douglas Kelley
11	Dennis Ryan
12	Rick Chesley
13	George Singer
14	Ronald Peterson
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1	PROCEEDINGS
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3	THE COURT: We are on the record.
4	The matter at bar is in the jointly administered
5	Chapter 11 cases under the lead case of Petters
6	Company, Inc., File 08-45257.
7	Today's hearing concerns the United
8	States Trustee's appointment of a single trustee
9	for the estates of the various debtors in this
10	group of cases and the objection of certain
11	parties in interest to it.
12	I will ask counsel to note appearances
13	for record here first.
14	MR. JORISSEN: Good afternoon, Your
15	Honor, James Jorissen on behalf of Ritchie
16	Capital Management, Ltd., Limited, Ritchie
17	Capital Structure Arbitrage Tradings, Ltd.,
18	Ritchie Special Credit Investments, Ltd.,
19	Yorkville Investment I, LLC and Rhone Holdings
20	II, Ltd.

21	Also in court with me today, Your Honor,
22	is Brian Krakauer from Sidley & Austin in
23	Chicago, my co-counsel. Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Very good.
25	MR. RUNCK: Good afternoon, Your
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1	Honor. David Runck on behalf of the Unsecured
2	Creditor's Committee and with me today is
3	Mr. Ronald Peterson who's the chairperson of our
4	committee.
5	THE COURT: All right.
6	MR. LODOEN: James Lodoen on behalf
7	of Douglas Kelley. Also with me today is George
8	Singer and Mr. Kelley is in the courtroom as
9	well.
10	MR. RIDGWAY: Good afternoon, Your
11	Honor. Michael Ridgway and Robert Raschke on
12	behalf of the United States Trustee.
13	THE COURT: All right. Appearances
14	are as noted then.
15	Well, the matter is on for hearing on the
16	objection of the clients of Mr. Jorissen and
17	Mr. Krakauer. I think I'd like Mr. Ridgway maybe

to just frame up just the history of today's

19	proceedings so we can lay the groundwork and I am
20	sure you have got that readily at hand and can do
21	that in a couple of minutes.
22	MR. RIDGWAY: Thank you, Your Honor.
23	May it please the Court and Counsel, as the Court
24	notes these various cases were filed in mid to
25	late October, ten entities all associated with

2 companies or subsidiary companies. The United States Trustee on December 2, 2008 filed it's motion under Section 1104 of the 4 Bankruptcy Code for the appointment of a 5 Chapter 11 trustee, arising in no small part due 6 7 to the fact that Mr. Kelley as the District Court appointed receiver, although we had authority to 8 9 file the bankruptcy petitions, it was the 10 position of the United States Trustee that from 11 that point thereafter he lacked any ability to go forward and since none of these ten entities 12 13 really had management in place to act as a debtor 14 in possession, the United States Trustee filed 15 his motion. On December 16, 2008 this Court conducted 16

Thomas Petters in some fashion as the main

17	a hearing with regard to that. The Ritchie
18	Company and the various entities also filed it's
19	motion for the appointment of a Chapter 11
20	trustee, although they went one step further in
21	that they had also asked for the appointment of a
22	separate trustee for PGW.
23	This Court by virtue of it's order dated
24	December 17, 2008 granted the United States
25	Trustee's motion for the appointment of a

2 Ritchie Group also asked for that same release, 3 granted it, leaving it to the United States Trustee's discretion under Federal Rule of 4 Bankruptcy Procedure 2009(c)(2) to conduct that 5 6 appointment. 7 Pursuant to the obligations imposed upon 8 him by Rule 2007.1(c) the United States Trustee 9 consulted the various parties in interest. You will note that together with the application 10 11 seeking the Court's approval of Mr. Douglas 12 Kelley, those parties were set forth and they are also set forth in the memorandum entitled United 13

States Trustee's Reply to the Ritchie Objection.

Chapter 11 trustee and to the extent that the

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15	We are here today then after the
16	discovery request on the part of the Ritchie
17	Group to, among other things, ask for the
18	deposition of Mr. Kelley for various other
19	documentation.
20	Pursuant to the hearing held in this
21	court last Thursday, the Court denied the motion
22	of Ritchie for discovery, instead indicating that
23	today's hearing would be held and that brings us
24	here to the present status.
25	Thank you, Your Honor.

1	THE COURT: All right. Good enough.
2	All right, Mr. Jorissen.
3	MR. JORISSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	Before I begin with my remarks, I would like to,
5	with the Court's permission, reserve a brief
6	period of time for rebuttal after the other
7	parties have been through their arguments.
8	THE COURT: Of course, we will take
9	at least another round.
10	MR. JORISSEN: Thank you, Your
11	Honor.
12	Your Honor, as Mr. Ridgway noted, we're

13	here today on Ritchie's objection to the
14	appointment of Douglas A. Kelley as Trustee for
15	all of the debtors in these jointly administered
16	cases and for a number of reasons we do not
17	believe that Mr. Kelley can simultaneously serve
18	as Trustee for all of the debtors in these cases
19	as well as the receiver for all of the Petters
20	companies in the pending receivership action.
21	We also think that Mr. Kelley by virtue
22	of the obligations imposed upon him by law if he
23	were to be appointed Trustee for all of the
24	separate debtor's entities in these cases has
25	conflicts of interest which would preclude him

L	irom	so	serving.

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I want to make it clear, Your Honor, that 3 we are not in this proceeding attacking Mr. Kelley personally or professionally.

We simply believe that in view of his obligations under the receivership order as well as the obligations that would devolve upon him were he appointed Trustee in each of these cases that he has conflicts of interest or divided loyalties which would preclude him from

11 faithfully fulfilling his obligations to all of 12 the different entities to which he will be a 13 fiduciary. Now, during the hearing on Thursday of 14 15 last week, Your Honor, you indicated that the 16 question of whether Mr. Kelley in his capacity as 17 receiver has a conflict of interest which would 18 prevent him from serving as Trustee in these 19 cases can be determined by looking at the four corners of the receivership order and that order, 20 of course, is the second amended order that Judge 21 22 Montgomery entered in the case that's part of the record in these proceedings, so I am going to 23 start with the receivership order because I think 24

that's the framework in which you have indicated

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2	Under the terms of the order Mr. Kelley
3	is obligated to, quote, coordinate with
4	representatives of the United States Attorney and
5	court personnel as needed to ensure that any

you would view this question.

assets subject to the terms of this order are available for criminal restitution, forfeiture or

8 other legal remedies and proceedings commenced by

or on behalf of the United States. 9 10 His charge then under the terms of the receivership order is to maximize the assets of 11 the receivership estate and, in essence, to help 12 the United States to build his case -- to build 13 14 it's case for the inclusion of these assets in 15 the receivership estates ultimately so that they 16 can be made available for legal remedies that the 17 United States may wish to avail itself of. THE COURT: What do you mean in 18 19 essence to help the United States build it's 20 case? MR. JORISSEN: He is -- he's obliged 21 22 to coordinate with the United States to ensure 23 that all of the assets, all of the assets of all 24 of the affiliated companies covered by the order are brought into the receivership estates and the 25

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order specifies that the purpose of doing so is
to make the assets available to the United States
for criminal restitution, forfeiture or other
legal remedies, so what is that charge? Well, to
me what that means is that his job is to put a
context around those assets that would bring them

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7 into the receivership estate. 8 Now, how does that happen? Well, it 9 happens if they are ultimately determined to be subject to some remedies by the United States. 10 11 He -- let me put in a different way, 12 Judge. He has an obligation to assist the United 13 States to ensure that the assets are part -- to 14 maximize the receivership estate and that is 15 the --THE COURT: Is there even an estate 16 17 per se in a receivership? I mean we have an 18 estate in a bankruptcy case arising automatically by operation of laws as soon as the bankruptcy 19 petition is filed, but does a so-called equity 20 21 receivership under the statutory authority that the United States used, does that give rise to an 22 estate per se? 23 MR. JORISSEN: Well, I believe, Your 24 25 Honor, that the receivership order gives rise to

L	an estate which consists of all of the property
2	that is subject to the receivership and the order
3	quite clearly delineates those assets that the
4	judge has directed Mr. Kelley to bring into the

5	estate or into the receivership, if you will, and
6	those assets consist broadly of all of the assets
7	of Petters Company, Inc., PGW and all of the
8	affiliated companies.
9	Now, in carrying out his mandate to help
10	the United States gather these assets, Mr. Kelley
11	has appointed and has been authorized to appoint
12	professionals including Price Waterhouse Coopers
13	and others to analyze the financial affairs of
14	PCI, PGW and the remainder of the bankrupt and
15	non-bankrupt affiliates.
16	These retentions were made outside of the
17	bankruptcy cases by Mr. Kelley in his capacity as
18	receiver.
19	The receivership order makes it clear
20	that the professionals Mr. Kelley retains,
21	including Price Waterhouse, are retained to help
22	him in fulfilling his duties under the terms of
23	the receivership order and specifically his duty
24	to coordinate with the United States to ensure
25	that the maximum amount of assets are available

in the receivership proceeding.

2 Because of his responsibilities under the

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3	receivership order, Mr. Kelley has a conflict of
4	interest. He is bound by Judge Montgomery's
5	order to help the United States to maximize the
6	pool of assets subject to the receivership.
7	THE COURT: Who is he chargeable too?
8	What does the order say?
9	MR. JORISSEN: The order says he's
10	accountable only to the District Court.
11	THE COURT: Right. And there's a
12	grant of judicial immunity
13	MR. JORISSEN: Correct.
14	THE COURT: in so many words to
15	him and it says he's to account to the District
16	Court, it sort of serves as the District Court's
17	eyes, ears and hands in amassing and holding the
18	assets, right?
19	MR. JORISSEN: I concur with that,
20	Your Honor, yes.
21	THE COURT: Okay. All right.
22	MR. JORISSEN: It's his job to I
23	mean one way to look at it is it is his job to
24	help the United States to maximize this pool of
25	assets and the United States, if nothing else, if

you step back and look at this, they are a major

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plaintiff or the major plaintiff in these cases, these myriad of Petters and Polaroid cases. They are at the end of day going to make some claim to the assets of this receivership and although we were unable to take discovery related to these issues, if seems pretty clear that the efforts of Price Waterhouse Cooper, Lindquist & Vennum and the other professionals Mr. Kelley has retained have all been directed toward helping the United States to ensure the availability of these assets or not all of their efforts, but a primary focus of their efforts was to help the United States to ensure that all the assets would be available for whatever remedies or ultimately are prescribed. THE COURT: What was it that was the immediate precipitant of this proceeding? Why did the United States start the receivership proceeding? Wasn't it pretty obvious that it was the concern that substantial value, conceivably in the hundreds of millions of dollars could disappear? MR. JORISSEN: Absolutely. I mean I think what precipitated the commencement of the receivership proceeding was in large part

1	information which we can only glean from the
2	search warrant which was executed by Special
3	Agent Price which is also included in the
4	materials that we have submitted to the Court and
5	I think in those materials what Special Agent
6	Price had indicated was that there was probable
7	cause to believe that PCI and I would note,
8	Your Honor, she does not say anything in her
9	affidavit which supported the search warrant
10	regarding PGW, but that PCI was in essence, and I
11	am taking substantial liberty with her affidavit
12	here, but it was being operated as a fraud on
13	creditors and no doubt the purpose that or
14	what lead to the commencement of the receivership
15	proceeding was the United States' belief that
16	wire and mail fraud were being committed and that
17	it would be appropriate to appoint a receiver to
18	try to preserve the value of the assets of the
19	Petters entities. I think that's not subject to
20	reasonable debate.
21	THE COURT: All right. But I mean
22	it's a hold in place measure?
23	MR. JORISSEN: Correct.
24	THE COURT: Nothing is to go beyond
25	the four C's, no assets, no money, no monies to

1	disappear, assets were not to disappear,
2	Mr. Kelley was appointed by the District Court
3	chargeable to Judge Montgomery to make sure that
4	that didn't happen, to collect things.
5	MR. JORISSEN: Well, I think that's
6	part of his charge, but I think his charge under
7	the receivership order is much broader than that.
8	He's to manage the entities. He's to take
9	control of the entities and notably he's to
10	assist the United States to ensure that the
11	maximum amount of assets are available for their
12	purposes, be they restitution, criminal
13	forfeiture or other legal proceedings and that
14	manifests from Term 7 of Judge Montgomery's
15	order.
16	THE COURT: So you're jumping over to
17	the verb assist from the verb coordinate?
18	MR. JORISSEN: Well, no. The verb is
19	actually ensure.
20	THE COURT: Ensure?
21	MR. JORISSEN: I mean coordinate with
22	the United States to ensure that, and I am taking
23	liberty with the language of Judge Montgomery's
24	order, but that the maximum amount of assets are

25 available for the purposes specified in the

1	order.
2	THE COURT: Maybe I am taking liberty
3	with the remarks you just made, and I am saying
4	that with a smile quite frankly, but I thought I
5	heard the word assist in your remarks and maybe
6	I'm not doing justice but anyway, the record is
7	what it is. I can listen in.
8	MR. JORISSEN: No, and I do think,
9	Your Honor, that there is a tenure of the order
10	which clearly requires Mr. Kelley to assist the
11	United States and I think it's been going on. I
12	think the whole purpose of the forensic analysis
13	which has been conducted by Price Waterhouse
14	Cooper is to try to untangle the morass of
15	transactions which we have all heard about in
16	these proceedings and in the receivership
17	proceedings and a major point of that is to
18	provide that information to the United States so
19	that in the context of attempting to ascertain
20	what should be in the receivership they will have
21	a full picture of what all the different
22	interactions were between the Petters entities

and various other parties, so I think there is
indeed active assistance that is going on.

I would note that Mr. Kelley has

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indicated that he has had a number of discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office and we don't know the scope and content of those discussions and we haven't been able to discover that information in the course of these proceedings, so we don't -- I mean I am just telling you we don't know what the game plan is as between Mr. Kelley and the United States and we don't know the specifics of any communications that Mr. Kelley has had with the United States, but what we do know --THE COURT: I got to remind you, you know, we're talking about two different branches of Government here though. The order makes him chargeable to Judge Montgomery alone. She's in the judicial branch. MR. JORISSEN: I concur. He's accountable, but he's also under a mandate under the order again going back to Term 7 to work with the United States, to ensure that the maximum amount of assets are available for the remedies

that are outlined in the order, so I do think
that there is a cooperative element that is going
on between Mr. Kelley and the United States
Attorney's Office and I would venture to guess
that a large part of the reason for having Price

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1 Waterhouse do the forensic analysis is so that 2 the Government can have access to that 3 information as it moves forward both to prosecute criminal claims, but also for purposes of civil 4 5 or criminal forfeiture or other proceedings. 6 As the receiver, Mr. Kelley is an 7 advocate for the receivership and we think he gives direction to that effect to the 8 professionals that he retains and we think that 9 if he is fulfilling his mandate under the 10 receivership order he has no choice but to direct 11 12 the activities of his professionals in a manner 13 that will maximize the assets of the receivership and ultimately to the benefit of the United 14 15 States. 16 Now, it is true that Mr. Kelley is not 17 the person who's going to finally determine what 18 assets are in, what assets are out, who gets what assets, if anyone gets any assets out of these
receivership cases. That decision will
ultimately be made presumably by Judge Montgomery
or potentially by some other judge who would get
the draw in some form of ancillary proceeding for
that purpose.

But that doesn't change the fact that

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Mr. Kelley as receiver has the charge to maximize 1 2 the receivership estate or assets in the receivership and we think his activities have 3 been undertaken with that end in mind. 4 5 Now, we think that this creates a current and direct conflict which precludes Mr. Kelley 6 7 from serving as trustee in these cases. As Chapter 11 Trustee, Mr. Kelley's first 8 fidelity is to the creditors of the bankruptcy 9 estate and he is charged by law with the 10 11 responsibility to maximize the assets available to creditors of the bankruptcy estates in these 12 13 cases and to that end he's supposed to be an advocate for the Chapter 11 estates, but under 14 15 the Order and this gets back to the word ensure, 16 he has a duty to ensure that the maximum amount

of assets are available to the receivership and
as Chapter 11 Trustee, he may well have to -- he
does have to oppose the maximum amount to the
extent that any of the property that is currently
within the receivership estate is also either
arguably or actually property of the bankruptcy
estate.

He has a clear fiduciary duty as the
Trustee to seek to maximize that pool for the

benefit of the Chapter 11 estates and he can't do
both. He can't maximize the receivership estates
and maximize the Chapter 11 estates. Every
dollar that gets pulled over into the
receivership estate is a dollar that doesn't come
into the Chapter 11 cases.

We -- it's really hard to imagine that
Mr. Kelley, given those parameters, given the
parameters of Judge Montgomery's order can
effectively and zealously and dispassionately and
disinterestedly fulfill his obligations to both
the receivership or to Judge Montgomery under the
receivership order and to the United States under

15	these jointly administered cases and in
16	particular in the PGW case.
17	THE COURT: So is it your position
18	then that somehow his duties as receiver as to
19	the assets of these corporate entities now in
20	Chapter 11 somehow survived the Chapter 11
21	filings and he bears both statuses then, carries
22	both statuses as to these companies?
23	MR. JORISSEN: I think that's
24	correct, Your Honor. I think if you look at the
25	language of the receivership order there's

1	nothing in the language of the order itself that
2	says that upon the commencement of a bankruptcy
3	case Mr. Kelley shall cease to be receiver and
4	shall cease to have the obligations specified
5	under the order, including, you know, all of
6	those things that we talked about, the management
7	of the companies, the rest of it. There's
8	nothing in the order to that effect.
9	All the order says is that in a
10	Chapter 11 case the rules of bankruptcy procedure
11	and the federal or the Bankruptcy Code will
12	apply, but Mr. Kelley hasn't stepped down as

13	receiver. He hasn't case indicated an intention
14	to step down as receiver and there's nothing in
15	the confines of the order itself which indicates
16	that if Mr. Kelley is some day appointed Trustee
17	in these Chapter 11 cases that his status as
18	receiver will be terminated, so I don't think
19	there is anything that says one way or the other
20	that Mr. Kelley has ceased his role as receiver
21	and I think the opposite is true. I think the
22	order makes it quite clear that until such time
23	as Judge Montgomery were to revisit the issue,
24	he's the receiver for PGW, for PCI and for all of
25	the other eight Petters entities that are debtors

1	in these proceedings.
2	I think there are other provisions of the
3	order that are also inconsistent with
4	Mr. Kelley's services trustee for PGW or any
5	other debtors. The order as you noted gives
6	Mr. Kelley judicial immunity for his activities
7	as receiver.
8	As a Chapter 11 Trustee, he would
9	typically be accountable to the creditors for
10	and I am not suggesting anything by this, but for

ΙΙ	any misconduct or breach of his fiduciary duties
12	that occurred during the administration of these
13	cases and as an agent of the District Court with
14	judicial immunity under the receivership order,
15	it looks like Mr. Kelley has no accountability to
16	the creditors who populate these Chapter 11
17	estates and the there was a in the motion
18	to appoint a Trustee that the U.S. Trustee's
19	Office filed back in November, they cited a case
20	which talked about why a receiver is a custodian
21	and therefore cannot serve as debtor in
22	possession and has to is subject to the
23	turnover provisions under Section 543 and that
24	case noted that the receiver is, in fact, an
25	agent of the District Court accountable only to

1	the District Court. The receiver's allegiances
2	thus lie first to the District Court and so there
3	is a question and I think it's a live question
4	about whether or not Mr. Kelley, given the broad
5	immunity that has been given him under Judge
6	Montgomery's order, has the kind of
7	accountability to the estates in this case that a
8	Chapter 11 Trustee or debtor in possession would

9 typically have. 10 THE COURT: The U.S. Trustee's order 11 or, excuse me, appointment does require him to be 12 bonded. MR. JORISSEN: I understand that. 13 14 THE COURT: I mean that pre-supposes 15 an accountability then to the creditors. 16 MR. JORISSEN: But I guess the 17 confusion or maybe it's not confusion, but I 18 think, Your Honor, that the broad immunity that's 19 been granted in the receivership order has not 20 been explicitly set aside. Mr. Kelley hasn't walked away from it. I 21 haven't -- there hasn't been any mention of any 22 intention to ask the District Court here to 23 24 revoke that immunity insofar as it relates to the 25 administration of these Chapter 11 cases and so I

1	think that there's a live issue as it relates to
2	whether anyone could hold Mr. Kelley to account
3	for his activities as Trustee in these cases by
4	virtue of the immunity granted by Judge
5	Montgomery.
6	Now, the Trustee the U.S. Trustee and

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7 the Creditor's Committee seek to dismiss the conflict that arises by virtue of Mr. Kelley's status as a receiver as imaginary and this kind 9 of goes back to your question about whether these 10 receivership or his role as receiver will be 11 12 terminated if he is permitted to serve as Trustee 13 and in their pleadings on this issue they just 14 make a leap of faith. They just say that the --15 his role -- his job as receiver of PGW, of PCI 16 will just end if he's appointed Trustee, but 17 that's not what the receivership order says, nor do they cite any case law to support that 18 19 premise. They have cited no authority, no case 20 21 law, no statutory authority that says that a 22 receiver who is still a receiver who is appointed 23 as a Trustee somehow ceases to be the receiver and I don't think there is any support for that 24

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I think that Mr. Kelley is the receiver
for these entities and I think he will continue
to do so until that status is revoked by Judge
Montgomery or he abdicates that status.

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position.

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5	Now, because Mr. Kelley is the receiver
6	for PGW, PCI and all of these Petters entities,
7	there's another legal impediment that precludes
8	him from serving and it's the same legal
9	impediment that lead the United States Trustee to
10	seek a motion to appoint a Trustee in the first
11	instance and that is he's subject as receiver to
12	the turnover provisions under Section 543 and
13	under Section 543(a) as was discussed at the last
14	hearing on this topic once a bankruptcy case is
15	commenced a receiver is a custodian and as a
16	custodian they are required to turn over all
17	property of the estate to the Trustee, but 543(a)
18	goes further and it says that custodian can take
19	no further action in the administration of the
20	property of the debtor or property of the
21	estates, so under 543(a) because he is still the
22	receiver he's disqualified from serving for the
23	same reason that he was disqualified from serving
24	last time.
25	And I would note that the prohibition

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under 543(a) which precludes or would preclude a
custodian from taking action in the

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3	administration of property, that prohibition
4	would seem to preclude Mr. Kelley from
5	undertaking most of the obligations that he would
6	have as Trustee in these jointly administered
7	Chapter 11 cases.
8	We also believe, Your Honor, that
9	Mr. Kelley cannot simultaneously serve as the
10	Trustee for both PCI and PGW.
11	THE COURT: So you have just been
12	talking what I would call sort of the external
13	conflict that you allege?
14	MR. JORISSEN: Yes.
15	THE COURT: External to the structure
16	of bankruptcy and now you're going to talk about
17	what I would call an internal conflict?
18	MR. JORISSEN: Correct. The conflict
19	of one Trustee representing more than one
20	bankruptcy estate in this context.
21	And as we have outlined in our objection
22	and elsewhere, Your Honor, probably more times
23	than you would have liked, as the PGW Trustee,
24	Mr. Kelley would be duty bound to attempt to
25	maximize the assets of PGW for the benefit of

PGW's creditors and as Trustee for PCI he will 1 2 have the same obligations for PCI's creditors. And during the October 22nd, 2008 hearing 3 4 in this matter very early on Mr. Lodoen pointed out that Polaroid appears to be the major asset 5 6 that will come under administration by Mr. Kelley 7 and, as you know, Your Honor, Polaroid is a 8 wholly owned PGW subsidiary and as the Trustee for PCI we have no doubt that Mr. Kelley in 9 10 fulfilling his obligations to the creditors of PCI will be duty bound to pursue claims against 11 PGW and as Trustee for PGW he would have 12 obligations to try and fend off those claims for 13 the benefit of PGW's creditors. 14 We do believe and I have talked about 15 16 this already, but I will briefly run through it, we do believe that the evidence that has been 17 made public thus far shows that PCI was the 18 19 vehicle through which this fraud was undertaken and it is true that the indictment broadly 20 implicates all of the Petters entities including 21 PGW in this fraud, but the indictment addendum 22 23 itself only mentions PGW in a couple of places. 24 There are no specific allegations of any 25 wrongdoing by PGW other than defendants -- other

than a conclusary defendants engaged in the 1 2 following activities. The search warrant on the other hand 3 4 which we have put into the record lays out in 5 detail what the Government believes the fraud was 6 in this case and that search warrant makes no 7 mention of PGW. It talks in detail about how PCI 8 sold -- lent or got loans from creditors based on fictitious inventory and how the whole Ponzi 9 scheme was apparently carried out, but there's no 10 11 mention of PGW engaging in any of those sorts of activities. 12 13 PGW has operating assets and PCI doesn't 14 and the reality is that they were operated or 15 they appear to have been operated or at least the best information that we can glean from what's 16 publicly available is that PGW was operated as a 17 separate company and engaged in separate 18 transactions and was not the vehicle through 19 which the Ponzi scheme was undertaken. 20 21 Now, instead of really focusing on the 22 conflict issue, Mr. Kelley and his counsel and in some ways the Creditor's Committee and the U.S. 23 24 Trustee have staked out a position that Ritchie 25 is not a creditor of PGW because the funds that

it wired to fund loans to PGW were sent to PCI

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2	and in their proof they have selectively
3	disclosed portions of what of materials which
4	bear the legend attorney-client privilege,
5	attorney-work product and they have put that into
6	the record, but whatever their contentions in
7	that regard, there is no dispute, no dispute and
8	no one said it that PGW signed and delivered
9	promissory notes to the Ritchie entities and
10	there is no dispute that Ritchie is a creditor
11	which has a contract claim against PGW.
12	The argument that Ritchie is not a
13	creditor of PGW necessarily rests upon the
14	conclusion which has not been substantiated that
15	PGW was insolvent at the time that these notes
16	were given to Ritchie.
17	To the extent that this analysis has been
18	performed, we have not been made privy to any of
19	that analysis and that insolvency analysis, if
20	it's undertaken, eventually will depend in large
21	part on the validity of lots of claims and lots
22	of assets depicted on financial statements and
23	undoubtedly a very complicated analysis to figure
24	out whether PGW was, in fact, insolvent, but the
25	fact that Mr. Kelley or his counsel believed that

1	these transactions may be proven to be avoidable
2	as to PGW someday does not undermine Ritchie's
3	status as a PGW creditor at this juncture or it's
4	status as a party in interest who withstanding
5	to raise the arguments that have been raised
6	here.
7	The arguments that Mr. Kelley and his
8	counsel have raised regarding the nature of
9	Ritchie's claims are also suggestive of a certain
10	bias against a class of PGW creditors.
11	Mr. Kelley appears to have prejudged the
12	validity of Ritchie's claims. He's done so based
13	on a transactional analysis performed by his
14	professionals in the receivership which by his
15	own admission are at this point incomplete and
16	given that the charge of those professionals
17	acting under the authority granted to Mr. Kelley
18	in the receivership action was to maximize the
19	assets available to the receivership estates.
20	It wouldn't be and I have no evidence of
21	this, but it would not be impossible to imagine
22	that the analysis was geared to scrutinize
23	certain transactions to drive potentially a

certain result and again we haven't been able to
get to the bottom of that, but it's not hard to

believe that that could be the case.

Now, with respect to this representative conflict issue, Your Honor, we do think that

Mr. Kelley has a personal stake in his status as receiver. He does receive fees for the performance of his duties as receiver and it also appears that he intends or he hasn't indicated an intention not to. He intends to administer the PGW PCI assets in the receivership proceedings. He hasn't indicated that he would step aside from those duties.

So to the extent that he's engaged in the administration of those assets or those assets are retained in the receivership, he stands to benefit from that because he is compensated through the receivership proceedings for the work that he performs in that -- in that capacity.

The argument of the Trustee and the Creditor's Committee that the appointment of separate Trustees will create duplication of effort and additional expense is somewhat of a

said at the last hearing on our motion and the

Trustee's motion to appoint a trustee, we have an

22 red herring.
23 First, Your Honor, we are not saying that
24 the Court needs to appoint 11 Trustees. As I

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2 interest in having what we consider to be a 3 disinterested Trustee in the PGW bankruptcy case. We think that the other estates are closely 4 5 aligned with PCI because we think that those 6 other bankrupt entities were largely used as 7 funding vehicles to bring money into PCI. So we don't think that the Court needs to appoint 10 8 separate Trustees, one for PGW would be fine with 9 10 us. We also would note that despite the 11 12 arguments about increasing the cost of 13 administration the debtors or the Trustee or 14 Mr. Kelley, his representatives, have appointed 15 Houlihan & Lokey or have sought the employment of Houlihan & Lokey and they are getting a pretty 16 17 good deal. They are not -- their fees will be 18 earned without reference to the value that is 19 provided to the estate or the hourly work that

they have performed in getting to whatever result
they ultimately get to.

Similarly, although the Creditor's

Committee objects on the same basis that there
will be an incremental increase in expense
associated with the appointment of a different

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2 the fact that Mr. Kelley has already retained a 3 lot of professionals who are doing forensic accounting work and the like in the receivership 4 5 case and in the Polaroid case, frankly, the Creditor's Committee has retained it's own 6 7 financial advisors to work on the issues that 8 interest the Committee and they don't seem to 9 have any qualms about those increased costs of administration. 10 11 The -- whatever the incremental expense, 12 and I would submit that this is not going to 13 create a keystone cops scenario that's been 14 suggested by other Counsel, whatever the 15 incremental cost the case law seems to be pretty 16 clear that where there is a conflict, where the 17 Trustee is not disinterested, then costs have to

trustee for PGW, the Creditor's Committee despite

yield to disinterestedness and so we think that
although no doubt there would be some additional
expense if a Trustee were appointed for PGW, we
don't think that that factor should in any sense
carry the day here.

With respect -- I just want to offer an
illustration of why we think -- a couple of
illustrations of why we think there are conflicts

here, Your Honor.

In the first illustration is PGW has been indicted and we urged Mr. Kelley after the indictment came out to retain independent criminal counsel to represent PGW's interest in that case and as I noted in our last proceeding on these issues, we were concerned that in the absence of an independent lawyer for PGW we were concerned that -- some kind of plea would be negotiated which would result in an imminent forfeiture and to his credit Mr. Kelley has indicated through his Counsel, and I am not sure I know what the status of this is at this point, but they have indicated that they will reach out and pursue the appointment of independent counsel

16	and it may be that they have already found
17	someone and that someone has been retained.
18	The concern though is that that counsel,
19	his client, is the PGW Trustee and so it's
20	Mr. Kelley and insofar as Mr. Kelley has these
21	divergent strains on his activities, he has the
22	imperative from the District Court to maximize
23	the assets available for the receivership on the
24	one hand and he has the imperative under the
25	Bankruptcy Code to maximize the assets available

for these Chapter 11 estates. It puts him in a 1 2 terrible position in terms of trying to figure out how to deal with PGW. Do you fight the 3 4 charges, do you enter a plea, what do you do 5 about that and that is an obligation that as 6 Chapter 11 Trustee he may ultimately be called upon to decide. 7 I think another illustration of the 8 conflict, Your Honor, is that Mr. Kelley and his 9 counsel themselves believe that the receivership 10 order prohibits activities by the creditors in 11 this case, that creditors undertake in Chapter 11 12

bankruptcy cases and without revisiting the

L 4	hearing we had last Thursday, when we served
15	discovery on them their glib response was we
16	don't have to respond. We have got the District
17	Court's receivership order and that that
18	insulates Mr. Kelley from participating in
19	discovery in these proceedings.
20	Now, that attitude, I guess, is
21	reflective of a less than sincere desire to
22	engage in these bankruptcy proceedings in the
23	manner in which they should be engaged in and we
24	think that that's just another example of the
2.5	overlay, if you will, of the competing legal

1	regimes interfering with what we think would be
2	the functioning of a disinterested Trustee.
3	So to sum it up, Your Honor, we believe
4	that Mr. Kelley has conflicts of interest which
5	preclude his service as Chapter 11 Trustee in the
6	PGW case.
7	As receiver he has to advance the
8	interests ordered by Judge Montgomery to maximize
9	the receivership estates and this conflicts with
10	his obligation as Chapter 11 Trustee to maximize
11	the assets available for the bankruptcy estates

12	and in addition we believe a separate trustee
13	should be appointed for PGW as we think that any
14	Trustee for PCI, for the reasons we have
15	expressed, would labor under conflicts of
16	interests which would preclude that person from
17	fulfilling his or her fiduciary obligations.
18	THE COURT: Let me ask a question
19	that's really functional, really outcome oriented
20	in nature. What are you asking me to do? Are
21	you asking me to rule that Mr. Kelley can't serve
22	as Trustee at all in any of these cases and that
23	the U.S. Trustee to address what you term to be
24	the internal conflict should appoint then at
25	least two new persons as Trustee, one for PGW and

L	then one for any or all of the other entities?
2	Is that what you want to see coming out of this,
3	your client wants to see?
4	MR. JORISSEN: Your Honor, I think
5	our primary objective is to have a separate
6	Trustee appointed for PGW. We do think that in
7	view of the arguments that I have offered to Your
3	Honor that Mr. Kelley does have a conflict
9	because of the duties imposed under the

10	receivership order, but our primary objective is
11	to have a separate Trustee appointed for PGW.
12	THE COURT: So Ritchie wouldn't walk
13	away from this completely dissatisfied if I were
14	to leave the appointment of Mr. Kelley as Trustee
15	standing as to PCI and eight of the other
16	entities, but nonetheless rule that the U.S.
17	Trustee must appoint a separate Trustee for PGW.
18	MR. JORISSEN: I think your
19	assessment of that is correct, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: I just wanted to know
21	exactly what you want me to do because when you
22	get into the abstractions like this sometimes
23	that gets lost.
24	MR. JORISSEN: I understand.
25	THE COURT: Then when I go back to my

_	chambers I try to right out where where the
2	end really should lie if I buy into your
3	argument. All right. Okay. I don't have any
4	other questions.
5	MR. JORISSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: All right. I think the
7	U.S. Trustee would be the next one on here.

8 Mr. Ridgway. 9 MR. RIDGWAY: Thank you again, Your 10 Honor. Again, referring to the rules to kind of 11 12 frame-up procedurally what we're all about here 13 today in the fact that Ritchie has filed the 14 objection to our application to this Court 15 seeking Mr. Kelley's approval. I think it's 16 worthwhile to refer to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2009(d) which actually places the 17 18 burden upon them as the objecting creditor to show that the different estates will be 19 prejudiced by conflicts of interest of a common 20 21 Trustee. We submit, Your Honor, that they have 22 failed to do so in several respects. 23 24 In looking at the parameters of Judge 25 Montgomery's Second Amended Receivership Order

1	which was modified on December 8th of 2008 and I
2	cited this in my materials both on the front end
3	on the motion seeking the appointment and in the
4	reply to Ritchie's objection, specifically
5	Section 4, Paragraph B, Subpart 2C, noting

6	specifically that any bankruptcy cases so
7	commenced by the receiver shall during their
8	pendency be governed by and administered pursuant
9	to the requirements of the United States
10	Bankruptcy Code, 11 United States Code Section
11	101 at C and the applicable Federal Rules of
12	Bankruptcy procedure.
13	Contrary to the assertion of Ritchie tha
14	there's a problem here, I would submit that the
15	obligations of Kelley in his role as receiver for
16	the non-bankruptcy entities and Kelley in his
17	role, if approved by this Court, as the Trustee
18	for all of the bankruptcy cases are co-extensive
19	in the sense that, and I am going to borrow here
20	from the response of the committee, with regard
21	to the common goal, a single purpose, if you
22	will, to identify, preserve assets and maximize
23	the value for the benefit of creditors.
24	If approved by this Court, Mr. Kelley as
25	Trustee, and I do agree with Ritchie here, there

is an fiduciary obligation to the creditors of those ten bankruptcy estates and he's got to justify his conduct, not only to the creditors

4 but to this Court. 5 In that sense, he goes out, he identifies 6 assets, he does what he can to get the pool 7 together, but then before any distribution can be 8 had, he has to seek this Court's approval and 9 presumably with the giving of appropriate notice 10 for any hearing to be held there on. Similarly, 11 his role as receiver over here for the 12 non-bankruptcy entities goes forward, unencumbered with what his duties are as a 13 14 fiduciary if appointed by this Court for the 15 Chapter 11 estates. Mr. Jorissen had indicated that we had 16 cited no authority for the proposition that a 17 receiver has no further authority. I would 18 19 respectfully indicate that he was mistaken. In both the motion and in the reply we cite to In 20 Re: Madison Avenue Limited Partnership out of the 21 22 Southern District of New York, a 1997 case, 23 specifically quoted there from, since no section of the Code includes a receiver who remains in 24 25 possession within the definition of Trustee, the

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2	duties of a Chapter 11 Trustee or the somewhat
3	different ones of a debtor in possession.
4	Simply put, the receiver has absolutely
5	no responsibility to perform any other duties
6	which are the prerogative and burden of a debtor
7	in possession and a Trustee and, Your Honor, I
8	know and at the risk of sounding like a broken
9	record, the position of the United States Trustee
10	has always been that upon the filing of those
11	petitions his authority as receiver terminated by
12	operation of law. That was the motivation for
13	the United States Trustee to file his motion
14	seeking the appointment of a Trustee.
15	THE COURT: And that position then is
16	premised on what? There is, of course, the codes
17	explicit prohibition on the appointment of a
18	receiver by the bankruptcy court or within a
19	bankruptcy case after it's commenced, right?
20	MR. RIDGWAY: That's correct, 105
21	THE COURT: And then No. 2 you have
22	got the turnover obligation under Section 543.
23	MR. RIDGWAY: That's correct.
24	THE COURT: Which sort of has it's
25	bedrock presumption the fact that we don't do

1	receiverships in Bankruptcy Court. We do
2	trusteeships and Trustees or DIP's are the ones
3	who are legally charged with the assets.
4	MR. RIDGWAY: That's correct, Your
5	Honor.
6	THE COURT: So is there anything else
7	in the code that I have missed over the course of
8	nearly 25 years during which this issue has
9	almost never come up?
10	MR. RIDGWAY: Now, you haven't, Your
11	Honor. You have hit it very well and very
12	distinctly put I might add and you will recall
13	from Day 1 on the so-called first day motions, I
14	rose and qualified my remarks that day by
15	specifically referencing Section 543.
16	There is a concern here because these
17	corporations were essentially rutter less and
18	even though Mr. Kelley had been empowered by the
19	District Court order to collect assets and to do
20	his thing for the other assets and indeed gave
21	him the authority and power to file a petition,
22	it ceased upon the filing of those petitions by
23	virtue of the case law and the statutory
24	codifications we have just been visiting about
25	here.

1	I would also draw the court and counsel's
2	attention to the footnote that I dropped on
3	Page 6 here regarding the misapprehension, if you
4	will, of Ritchie's characterization of what
5	Mr. Kelley's role as a receiver is vis-a-vis the
6	Court and vis-a-vis the other party and I think
7	it bears repetition that Mr. Kelley, as receiver
8	now, is obligated to the Court, not the parties,
9	simply because a party may have put forth his
10	name, so to speak, does not make him in
11	allegiance with that party and the cases I have
12	cited, and it's a 1944 case, and as far as I know
13	it's still good law, Ledbetter vs. Farmers Bank
14	and Trust out of the Fourth Circuit, stands for
15	that proposition. His obligation is to the
16	Court. His obligation is to Judge Montgomery
17	collect the assets, again, for the non-bankruptcy
18	entities.
19	He does that over there and over here as
20	Trustee of these bankruptcy estates. He
21	identifies assets, preserves them and maximizes
22	their value for ultimate distribution to the
23	creditors and parties in interest.
24	THE COURT: It's never really been
25	built out in the record here and I only have sort

1	of a nazy understanding of what's really going or
2	in the District Court, but I have been able to
3	glean from all media coverage, for instance,
4	accessing some parts of the District Court's
5	public record through CM/ECF, I mean as receiver
6	Mr. Kelley is still administering assets that
7	have been personally vested in Tom Petters as an
8	individual, right?
9	MR. RIDGWAY: That's my
10	understanding too, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: And at least by media
12	reportage there was some significant value there
13	which he's been administering?
14	MR. RIDGWAY: That's correct.
15	THE COURT: And any other corporate
16	entities in which value was lodged presumably are
17	under the receivership still?
18	MR. RIDGWAY: That's correct.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MR. RIDGWAY: In fact, I would go
21	one step further then, Your Honor, by saying that
22	the reports that he has filed to date actually
23	demonstrate that as well so it's more than just

parenthetically that Mr. Kelley is under an

24 media reporting. Those are in the actual 25 documents on file and I might add too

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obligation from Judge Montgomery to file a report every 60 days and he's also bonded there too I might add and the Court had mentioned and again parenthetically I will mention that if this Court approves his appointment he will have to submit yet another bond that's suitable in form and substance through the office -- through the executive office of the United States Trustees in Washington. Let's turn now for a moment to the allegations of fraud that are contained in the indictment. The indictment was rendered by a Minnesota Grand Jury on December 1, 2008 and the three principal defendants are, of course, Mr. Petters himself individually as well as his two companies, Petters Company, Inc. and Petters Group Worldwide, LLC and Ritchie seems to belittle, I guess for lack of a better term, the exposure of Petters Group Worldwide with regard to what that document says.

Now, keep in mind that the duly issued indictment is a charge. It's an allegation, but there had to be a finding of probable cause for that grand jury to issue that, and keeping in

mind the presumption of beyond a reasonable doubt and all that, but I think it's still bears mentioning and I will and I noticed it in my reply that the language involving all of these defendants is more than just a passing reference to PGW in one count of the various counts.

For example, Counts 1 through 7 of the indictment charge both PCI and PGW, together with Mr. Petters, with aiding and abetting mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S. Code Sections 1341 and Section 2 and Section 2 is the aiding abetting statute, that if an individual or an entity is charged as an aider and abetter the code looks at them as if it was a principal, chargeable to the same extent and to the same degree.

Counts 8 through 10 of the indictment, again charge both PCI and PGW with aiding and abetting wire fraud and again Sections 343 and 18 U.S. Code Sub-Section 2.

20 Count 11 alleges Thomas Petters, PCI and 21 PCW, quote, did knowingly and wilfully combine, conspire and agree with each other and with 22 23 others known and unknown to the grand jury to commit offenses against the United States. 24 25 Count 12 alleges that Petters

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individually along with PCI and PGW were involved in a money laundering conspiracy, a conspiracy as wide reaching, all encompassing and it is indeed a pretty vast net that captures all of that illegal conduct, just as if Mr. Petters would be convicted in the first instance, so their attempt 7 at minimizing the role of PGW in the fraudulent scheme here I would submit is rather disingenuous. Now, let's look at the potential for forfeiture and the Court will notice that I took some time to kind of layout kind of giving an overview, if you will, of the world of criminal forfeiture as opposed to civil forfeiture and I note that the criminal forfeiture is an in personam thing as against the individual

defendant or individual corporate defendant as

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18	opposed to the civil which is an in rem, against
19	a thing kind of action.
20	The procedure is two-fold. Before a
21	conviction excuse me, before a forfeiture can
22	be had there has to be a conviction on that count
23	as to that defendant and the offense has to
24	provide for a criminal forfeiture. The jury has
25	to find a sufficient nexus between the individual

defendant and the bad conduct, but that's not the end of it.

The case law says that forfeiture is mandatory upon conviction as to that defendant, but that's not the end of the story. Third parties who may claim an interest in that particular asset or assets are not precluded from coming into the second part of this process called the ancillary proceeding and the ancillary proceeding is governed by the procedures that were initially contemplated by the Uniform Controlled Substances Act found under Title 21 and the references to Section 853 of Title 21 and how that goes about.

Interestingly enough before an individual

16	or an entity can come in and even assert standing
17	they have to assert some kind of interest or lien
18	in the specific property. If they don't have
19	that, they take on the status of a general
20	unsecured creditor and under 18 853 they don't
21	have a standing, but they can still come in
22	because that's not yet the end of it because
23	under Part 9 of the CFR, Title 28, the United
24	States Attorney General is vested with the
25	ability to provide some remedies in the form of a

1	petition or mitigation of the forfeited proceeds.
2	So in either event, if the forfeiture
3	comes about and I might make reference here
4	that it's not up to Mr. Kelley. I understand
5	that the language in Paragraph 6 of the
6	receivership order says that he has to
7	coordinate. I would submit that means gathering
8	together and making sure that they are there in
9	pot or one kiddy, but that's the end of it and
10	much like his duty is to this Court before he can
11	seek a distrubution, he's powerless to do
12	anything with that absent the action of the
13	United States Attorney to go after those assets

14	in a forfeiture proceeding and the Court to find
15	that forfeiture is appropriate given those
16	circumstances. The United States Attorney calls
17	the shots, not Mr. Kelley.
18	Let's turn now to what the Court in it's
19	colloquy with Counsel suggests is the internal
20	conflict and I guess I found it rather
21	interesting that in the appointed Trustee's
22	response found at Docket Entry No. 132 here that
23	in the prior State Court action in Cook County
24	that Ritchie sought and was granted apparently by
25	the Cook County Circuit Court the appointment of

1	an individual as receiver for the operations of
2	both PGW and PCI. Apparently at that time they
3	didn't seem to have the concern they raise here
4	today with regard to competing interests or
5	divided loyalties with regard to the receiver
6	that they sought and was granted approval by the
7	Cook County Circuit Court.
8	There are many cases out there that have
9	been cited both in my documents as well as the
10	committee's documents showing that the
11	appointment of a common trustee over several

12	associated entities, affiliated subsidiaries and
13	the like is not in and of itself or per se
14	renders a conflict of interest, rather there must
15	be some actual prejudice shown to the creditors
16	of the different estates before there should be
17	the appointment of a separate trustee.
18	With regard to the status of Ritchie as
19	creditor they could indeed be a creditor.
20	However, right now the schedules that have been
21	filed show them as disputed. That's ultimately
22	up for resolution by this Court as to whether or
23	not they have a legitimate claim in these
24	bankruptcy proceedings.
25	What it comes down to is Mr. Kelley has

been on board now as the receiver having got up
to speed, I would think in a very, very limited
and very short period of time with this complex
corporate world of Mr. Petters and all of the
complexities that go with it, he's been on board
now approximately 120 or so days, has been doing
his work as a trust excuse me, as a receiver
on the district court side and now he's being
called upon to do it here in this court as a

10	Trustee keeping in mind, I will say this again,
11	that the roles that he's playing in both receiver
12	over here for non-bankrupt entities and Trustee
13	here for bankruptcy entities is co-extensive.
14	There are no divided loyalties. There are no
15	conflicts of interest that would render him
16	disinterested as the bankrupt code requires.
17	Ritchie has not shown the requisite
18	prejudice that would attach to them. All of the
19	remedies would be available to them at the
20	conclusion of Mr. Kelley's efforts, pooling these
21	resources to come in and subject to this Court's
22	approval seek the approval for the distribution
23	scheme for those various assets and at some point
24	if things change and Ritchie, or for that matter
25	any other creditor of these ten bankruptcy

estates, would feel agreed that there would be a
conflict they are now precluded from coming
before this Court to demonstrate that prejudice
to either get him kicked off or to have a
separate Trustee appointed.
And there's also the concern, and I think
it bears saying, and I think the Committee again

8	has put it very well, it's necessary to avoid
9	duplicative administrative costs to protect these
10	estates from inefficient competition among the
11	various entities and to avoid inconsistent
12	results.
13	I don't think anybody here, and
14	Mr. Jorissen had indicated before, that their
15	position was not personal as to his professional
16	abilities. It would seem to me that if Judge
17	Montgomery had the full faith and confidence of
18	Mr. Kelley to do his thing as a receiver, I think
19	it also bears noting that he fully understands
20	his fiduciary responsibilities as to these
21	estates if this Court were to approve him. He
22	knows what's going on. He has exhibited a
23	professionalism at going about his duties as set
24	forth in the reports he's filed with the District
25	Court to date and with the position that he has

L	taken here before this court. We would
2	respectfully ask that the Court deny Ritchie's
3	objection as to all things and to appoint
4	Mr. Kelley as Trustee so we can get him bonded
5	and he can get about with the business in which

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6	he's charged.
7	Thank you, Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: Thank you. All right.
9	We will hear from the Committee next then.
10	Mr. Runck.
11	MR. RUNCK: Thank you very much, Your
12	Honor.
13	Your Honor, as stated in the Committee's
14	papers, we support the United States Trustee's
15	appointment of Mr. Kelley in these cases.
16	Mr. Kelley, in our view, he satisfies the
17	disinterestedness standard under Section 10114.
18	Your Honor, we have listened to Ritchie's
19	objection regarding Mr. Kelley's status as a
20	receiver in the District Court, Your Honor, and
21	we agree with the United States Trustee's
22	position that Mr. Kelley's status as receiver for
23	these bankruptcy debtors terminated upon the
24	filing of the bankruptcy petition and upon his
25	appointment as Trustee.

1	Your Honor, we think the case law
2	interpreting Section 543 is clear that says that
3	he is no longer acting as receiver for the

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4 debtors in these cases. He's only acting as 5 receiver for non-bankruptcy debtors. And as a case in point, Your Honor, that 6 7 I would bring the Court's attention to is a case by the Bankruptcy Court in the District of 8 9 Columbia. It's a 2004 decision called In Re: 10 Stratesec, S-T-R-A-T-E-S-E-C, and in that case, 11 Your Honor, the bankruptcy court was presented 12 with a similar situation as the Court is here 13 today whereby a pre-bankruptcy receiver had been appointed by another court. The receiver had 14 15 filed a petition in bankruptcy and then that 16 receiver was later in bankruptcy appointed as the trustee for the bankruptcy debtor. 17 18 In that case, Your Honor, the Court --19 the Bankruptcy Court said that the court should treat the receivership as suspended under 20 Section 543 and the receiver's role placed in 21 22 limbo with the receiver no longer playing a role as receiver. The Court then went on to say, Your 23 Honor, that -- first of all, the Court noted that 24

in the Supreme Court decision of Commodity

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2	there was a similar situation whereby there was a
3	pre-bankruptcy receiver that was later appointed
4	as a Trustee and the Bankruptcy Court in
5	Stratesec said that apparently there was no
6	problem in that case with that situation and they
7	went on to say that this Court is unaware of any
8	reason why such an appointment ought not to be
9	approved by this Court.
10	Your Honor, as shown by that case and as
11	the other cases under Section 543, Your Honor,
12	the Committee believes that it is clear that the
13	receivership over the bankruptcy debtors is no
14	longer in effect, Your Honor, and that
15	Mr. Kelley's status as a former receiver for
16	these bankruptcy debtors does not create a
17	conflict of interest and it does not cause any
18	problems under Section 10114.
19	Your Honor, as I stated previously
20	THE COURT: Let me ask you a
21	question.
22	MR. RUNCK: Sure.
23	THE COURT: If his status as receiver
24	terminated automatically by operation of law as
25	of the commencement of the case then from then at

1	least until the U.S. Trustee's active appointment
2	on December 24th, who was vested with legal
3	responsibility for the assets of these bankruptcy
4	estates?
5	MR. RUNCK: Sure, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: There was no Trustee.
7	There was a debtor in possession, but the
8	management of these companies have largely fled
9	or were suffered the infirmity of being barred
10	from being involved in management as a result of
11	the criminal case, so who was minding the store
12	legally speaking?
13	MR. RUNCK: Clearly Mr. Kelley was.
14	We're not
15	THE COURT: De facto, yes.
16	MR. RUNCK: Yes, yes. On a
17	practical basis, there's no question. I am
18	definitely not asserting that. As the U.S.
19	Trustee appointed in their pleadings, however,
20	there were substantial questions that were had
21	arisen with respect to his proper legal authority
22	to do so under Section 543. That issue has now
23	been resolved with the United States Trustee's
24	appointment of Mr. Kelley as a Trustee and now
25	Mr. Kelley as the appointed Trustee clearly has

the authority to act as such in bankruptcy.

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In the cases I have read under 2 3 Section 543 indicate that upon the appointment of 4 being a Trustee and in bankruptcy Mr. Kelley no 5 longer has the authority to act as receiver in 6 these cases and so Ritchie's arguments that 7 somehow he is subject to a dual duty or to conflicting strains, I think Mr. Jorissen 8 indicated, I just don't see how that can be the 9 10 case, Your Honor. Your Honor, with respect to the specific 11 12 arguments of a conflict that have been raised, 13 and I am not going to repeat all of them in 14 detail, but as we said in our papers, Your Honor, Ritchie has raised a number of alleged conflicts 15 and we don't believe that any of them are valid 16 under the current record before the Court. 17 18 Your Honor, we believe, and as I stated 19 previously before this Court, we believe that the 20 conflict of interest must be based on fact and it 21 can't be based on merely speculation and in this case, Your Honor, a number of, if not actually 22 23 all of Ritchie's alleged conflicts fail that 24 test. 25 The first one, of course, is they have

1 alleged that the fact that there inter-company

2	claims between PCI and PGW that somehow creates a
3	disqualifying conflict of interest, Your Honor,
4	that assertion has been clearly refuted by the
5	case the case law, including International Oil
6	which was referenced in our in our papers
7	which is by the Second Circuit. They have raised
8	the possibility of a future dispute over
9	substantive consolidation, Your Honor, and the
10	Ben Franklin case in Illinois clearly resolves
11	that and says that is no conflict. The
12	appointment of a common Trustee does not
13	prejudice party's ability to either support or
14	oppose substantive consolidation at a later time
15	and it does not create a conflict of interest.
16	Your Honor, as the U.S. Trustee pointed
17	out, the allegations that Mr. Petters' fraud was
18	committed solely through PCI and that PGW and
19	it's subsidiaries are completely innocent, the
20	facts to support that allegation just simply
21	don't exist at this point in time, Your Honor, so
22	there's no basis to declare a conflict based on
23	facts that we don't have at this time.
24	The Federal Grand Jury's investigation

25 said quite to the contrary. It made specific

1	allegations of criminal conduct against both PCI
2	and PGW.
3	Your Honor, on that point, I would also
4	call the Court's attention to Page 11 of the
5	criminal indictment, Your Honor, and that is the
6	money laundering count and in describing the
7	money laundering account, they clearly mention
8	that there was a wire transfer from PGW to
9	Mr. Petters' personal account, so there's a
10	specific mention of PGW there in addition to all
11	the other references to PGW, but then in
12	Counts 14 and 16, Your Honor, I would note that
13	there's also wire transfer that are alleged from
14	PCI.
15	Count 14 is an allegation of a wire
16	transfer in the amount of two and a half million
17	from PCI to an entity called U Bid, Inc. which is
18	a PGW subsidiary.
19	Count 16 alleges a wire transfer from PCI
20	to an entity called Innovative Campus which is
21	also a PGW subsidiary, so the assertion that PGW
22	is innocent and PCI was the sole vehicle for the

fraud in this case, the facts before the Court

just don't bear that out and there's no

justification to appoint a separate Trustee based

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on that type of assertion.

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Your Honor, with respect to the allegation that PCI and PGW have completely separate and distinct creditors and that PCI's creditors are fraud victims and PGW's creditors are not victims, that's another area that's just not born out by the facts, Your Honor. First of all, the proof of claim deadline hasn't been established yet in these cases and so we don't know which creditors are going to assert claims against which debtors and it seems likely, Your Honor, that many creditors out there are going to assert multiple claims against multiple debtors based on both contract theories and tort theories and in Ritchie's papers they seem to be focusing purely on contract claims, but a tort claim is also a claim in bankruptcy. So the bottom line is at this point in time we don't know whether or not PCI and PGW

have separate -- completely separate and distinct

creditors as was alleged and again there's no
basis to disqualify Mr. Kelley as a Trustee based
on that assertion.

And finally, Your Honor, as the U.S.

Trustee pointed out, the committee believes that

Mr. Kelley's duty as receiver for the

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2 non-bankruptcy entities and his duty as Trustee for the debtors in bankruptcy is completely 3 4 aligned. We think that his duty under both of 5 those authorities is to identify and maximize the value of assets wherever, if possible. 6 We do agree that he has a fiduciary duty 7 to all of the creditors in the bankruptcy cases. 8 There's no doubt about that. We just don't 9 believe that's a conflict because we think that 10 that interest is perfectly aligned with his duty 11 12 as receiver for the non-bankruptcy entities. 13 So, Your Honor, in conclusion, when we look at the actual evidence that's available at 14 15 this time, there's no evidence of a conflict of 16 interest here. There's no basis to find that 17 separate Trustees are required in this case. 18 There's no basis to disqualify Mr. Kelley as

having a conflict of interest and again as the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the

International Oil case, any type of judgment with

respect to a conflict of interest has to be based

on actual evidence. It can't be based on just

speculation and in this case, Your Honor, it's

completely appropriate for the U.S. Trustee to

appoint Mr. Kelley as the common Trustee for all of the debtors.

As this Court is well aware, bankruptcy is a zero sum game, so the more we double or triple the costs of the bankruptcy case the more professionals we bring into this, every single dollar that we spend on that infrastructure, that administrative infrastructure, that is taken away from the net recovery to creditors in this case.

In addition, Your Honor, the appointment of a separate Trustee would be disruptive.

Disqualifying Mr. Kelley and his professionals would be extremely disruptive and what Ritchie is asking for in this case would basically cause the creditors to lose both time and money in this case and we just simply can't afford to do that.

17	Thank you, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
19	All right. Let's see, Mr. Lodoen, I know you put
20	in a response on behalf of Mr. Kelley, but just
21	identify certain historical aspects of it because
22	if I remember the response correctly Mr. Kelley
23	didn't think that it would be appropriate to take
24	a substantive position per se, but I will turn
25	the floor over to you for whatever you want to

1 outline here. MR. LODOEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 3 Your characterization of our response is correct. It was meant to basically provide a factual 4 5 background for the Court and the other parties because, of course, Mr. Kelley has the best 6 7 understanding of the factual background of these entities at this time. 8 My comments today will likewise be 9 focused on some of the factual issues that were 10 raised before the Court. 11 First, Your Honor, you inquired about 12 judge -- or you have inquired about who was 13 essentially minding the shop, if you will, early 14

on in these cases and Mr. Kelley was acting
essentially as debtor in possession during that
period of time because Judge Montgomery's order,
first receiver order, said that he was entitled
to do that and that he should take that position
with respect to the bankruptcy cases that he
elected to put in bankruptcy proceedings.

That, in fact, is what triggered the
issues with the U.S. Trustee's Office saying
that, well, regardless of what the order says
that isn't -- that is inconsistent with how the

Bankruptcy Code works.

you case that was also cited. The order in that case said that the receiver could continue on as a debtor in possession in the Chapter 11 cases. In that particular case there wasn't a voluntary resolution. It's now on appeal to the Second Circuit. We deemed it appropriate to have some type of a resolution of that issue here so that the issues weren't -- weren't appealed and all the money spent on both parties pursuing that up to the Eighth Circuit with a continued period

13	of of wondering who really is entitled to mind
14	the store.
15	Once the court order in front of Judge
16	Montgomery was amended, mind you, Your Honor,
17	with the input of the United States Trustee's
18	Office who wanted to make sure that the
19	Bankruptcy Code governed and with the input of
20	the United States Attorney's Office who just said
21	whatever forfeiture rights there are aren't being
22	affected by this, they continue in effect
23	whatever they are, the status quo is maintained
24	on those as well, that amended order was was
25	submitted and signed by Judge Montgomery.

1	I think the real period of question is
2	probably from the date that this Court entered
3	the order appointing or authorizing the United
4	States Trustee to appoint Trustees in these cases
5	until the present moment period of authority is
6	somewhat in question.
7	The Court also inquired about whether
8	there's estates in the receivership proceedings.
9	We don't view there as being estates in those
10	proceedings. In fact, Mr. Kelley as the receiver

for various entities for various individuals, his money is brought in with respect to those various entities, money is put in accounts that are setup and established for those particular entities and the same thing is happening with respect to the individuals.

How those funds ultimately get allocated at the end remains to be seen. I will submit to the Court or tell the Court that as I mentioned in our response that in one of the cases as the funds were brought in for a smaller entity and the entity was wound down, those funds were distributed to those creditors on a prorata basis in that particular proceeding and we -- we have no reason to believe that the United States

Τ	Attorney's Office won't allow that as we go
2	forward.
3	When I say allow that, I mean bring
4	forfeiture proceedings with respect to various
5	entities. Ultimately it's up to Judge Montgomery
6	in the receivership matters to decide how the
7	receivership entities are handled, but there's

no -- Mr. Kelley has no knowledge today whether

9 there will be a forfeiture issue or not with 10 respect to the various cases, either in the 11 receivership or the cases in bankruptcy proceedings, whether that be Polaroid or whether 12 13 it be these cases where he is -- where his 14 appointment for Trustee is up for consideration. 15 Your Honor, I can also represent to the 16 Court that there is no game plan. There is no 17 agenda by Mr. Kelley or anyone else at this time as far as -- as far as he is -- as far as he is 18 19 aware. His job in the receivership proceedings 20 is to find and preserve assets so that they can 21 22 ultimately be distributed for various creditors 23 and parties who may have been harmed or who are 24 owed money by the various Petter entities. His role as a Trustee, if he is appointed 25

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as a Trustee in these cases, will be the same.
It will be to pull together assets. It will be
to analyze and pursue claims and will ultimately
be with the input of the various parties around
this courtroom today figure out how should these
assets be distributed, what's a fair and just and

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7 proper way to distribute assets to the various 8 creditors and parties who are claimed to be owed 9 money in these proceedings. Early on when we were first before the 10 11 Court I told Your Honor that PWC was in the 12 process of being retained to do the forensic 13 work. They were going to be doing that for all 14 the entities when a report is ultimately 15 prepared, that will be shared with all the 16 parties. 17 Mr. Kelley doesn't have an agenda. His objective is to pull together the information to 18 see where did the money go, where did it 19 20 originate, who has claims, who don't have claims, 21 who does he have claims against, who doesn't he 22 have claims against. Whether that's with respect to the various receiver entities or if he's 23 24 appointed Trustee in these cases with respect to these various entities. 25

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This isn't someone who's the owner of the businesses who's out trying to preserve his own -- his own equity interest. Mr. Kelley is not someone who wants to reorganize and keep all

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5	these businesses going forward into the future so
6	that he has a future for the next 20 years
7	running these entities like a lot of debtors do.
8	THE COURT: He may already be
9	looking forward to getting out of this business.
10	MR. LODOEN: Your Honor, there are
11	several days there I think that is that is the
12	case.
13	So the order with Judge Montgomery was
14	clearly revised in a way that tried to
15	accommodate everybody and I think if you ask the
16	parties around the courtroom today you will find
17	that they would say that there's a sense of
18	cooperation and accommodation and transparency
19	with Mr. Kelley and the various roles that he has
20	assumed today and, Your Honor, he clearly
21	understands that if he is appointed the Trustee
22	in these two cases he's answering to this Court
23	and the creditors in this case and not to Judge
24	Montgomery with respect to these proceedings.
25	He understands his role is different. He

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is -- he has studied various materials with
respect to the obligations of Trustees that have

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3 been provided to him. He has asked questions on the role of the Trustee and we have explained to 4 5 him what the role of the Trustee is. He understands in that role that he's a fiduciary of 6 7 this Court and to this particular estate and 8 takes that role seriously. 9 There's also a suggestion, Your Honor, 10 that his objective would be to pull money out of 11 these entities and send it to the receivership. Your Honor, to date actually the receivership 12 entities have been funding on a weekly or every 13 14 other week basis payroll and other expenses of PGW because PGW has no liquid assets. That seems 15 to be contrary to the suggestion of how he'd be 16 operating as a -- as a receiver if you were just 17 18 focusing on the receivership entities. Your Honor, I think it's also important 19 to understand or just take a look at the org 20 21 chart that was attached, I believe, as Exhibit G 22 or F to the response and I will just point out to the Court, what this org chart does is shows the 23 first tier entities and also the entities that 24 25 are in bankruptcy proceedings and I think it's

1	interesting to note that if you look at PGW right
2	at the top and you count under there, there are
3	approximately 22 first tier entities that are not
4	in bankruptcy proceedings today. Those are
5	entities that are subject to the receivership.
6	If a separate Trustee were appointed over
7	PGW, you would have a Trustee at the PGW level
8	that really doesn't have any assets other than
9	ownership, membership, LLC interest, stock
10	interest.
11	THE COURT: The equity.
12	MR. LODOEN: The equity in these
13	various subsidiary entities that are not
14	presently in bankruptcy proceedings, so you would
15	end up in a, it seems to me, somewhat of an
16	awkward scenario where you have got a receiver
17	who's controlling the subsidiary entities. You
18	have got a Trustee of PGW and then as it is
19	expected that one or more, but very likely not
20	all of those subsidiary entities will find their
21	ways into bankruptcy proceedings. What do you do
22	with those cases? Do you give them to Trustee
23	No. 3, Trustee No. 4 and Trustee No. 5 because
24	some of those entities have very, very
25	substantial cross claims across the whole

1	enterprise, up and down and sideways, in
2	particular Petters Capital, LLC and virtually all
3	of the entities have some inter-company
4	obligations.
5	So, Your Honor, I think in one sense this
6	is a real legal issue. In another sense it boils
7	down to a very practical and economical issue.
8	One cannot over emphasize the complexity of the
9	years of transactions, inter-company exchanges,
10	documentation that is quite frankly it's very
11	hard to find a deal that seems to have done
12	been done straight up in a way that everything
13	it's all got bells and whistles connected to it
14	and to try to understand, dig through all of that
15	and then figure out what to make of it, what
16	claims to pursue is a very expensive proposition.
17	It's already been very expensive to unwind
18	multiple ten billion dollars, whatever the
19	number of I don't know the number of
20	transactions that have gone back and forth over
21	the years, but at least the number that's been
22	that's documented on the books is claims in the
23	three to three and a half billion dollar range.
24	To unwind all of that and try to figure out how
25	to make sense of that is a very, very expensive

proposition no matter how you slice it. To add

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2	additional layers of Trustees who would want
3	their additional layers of professionals because
4	if there's a reason for separate Trustees,
5	there's probably a reason for separate
6	professionals, it would continue to exacerbate
7	the whole the whole prospect that a good chunk
8	of money recovered in these cases doesn't get
9	back to creditors and parties who have been
10	harmed, but instead just goes to more and more of
11	the professionals and we think that there are
12	obviously legal consideration, the economics
13	conditions are important as well.
14	Your Honor, just to conclude, I can
15	pledge that Mr. Kelley will, in whatever role the
16	Court places him, continue to cooperate with the
17	parties, to work with the parties in the various
18	interests, the various entities, the creditors,
19	the investors, et cetera, in as a cooperative way
20	as he can to share his information as it becomes
21	available, to seek consensus and ultimately to
22	try to bring parties to the table and if at some
23	point he gets to a position of an irreconcilable
24	conflict that he cannot that he cannot resolve

or that he cannot pursue, then we'll be back in

1	front of this Court with the United States
2	Trustee and the other parties seeking a
3	resolution as to how to deal with that particular
4	conflict at that point in time, but until that
5	point in time Mr. Kelley believes that he could
6	fulfill his obligations as a Trustee over these
7	entities in a way that is not in conflict with
8	his obligations as a receiver over the entities
9	that are presently administered by Judge
10	Montgomery.
11	THE COURT: So would I be accurate in
12	concluding then that if I were to approve the
13	appointment of Mr. Kelley as Trustee, he would go
14	forward as a Trustee in a Chapter 11 case,
15	collect assets and, for instance, if no
16	forfeiture proceedings entailing these companies
17	or their assets were prosecuted by the
18	Government, then he's just going to follow
19	through as a Chapter 11 Trustee and propose
20	distrubution by some means in accordance with the
21	priorities and the claims allowance process of
22	bankruptcy?

23 MR. LODOEN: Precisely. And in -24 the first order of business is collecting the
25 assets, then looking at various avoidance actions

1	against third parties. Those actions would be
2	pursued. Then if you get to the point of trying
3	to figure out whether there's avoidance actions
4	or what do you do with inter-company claims that
5	could be the point where he's got to come back
6	and say, okay, if there's something there that
7	has to be dealt with we may need somebody else to
8	step in for a limited purpose of handling that or
9	what may well be the case, Your Honor, is that a
10	motion for some consolidation is brought at some
11	point in time and if that is ultimately granted,
12	then a lot of that inter-company stuff really
13	disappears and we'll have to ultimately see what
14	the PWC final report looks like, analyze that
15	information and then decide whether a motion for
16	substantive consolidation in this case makes
17	sense or not and, of course, the Court is the
18	final decider of that point.
19	THE COURT: What position does
20	Mr. Kelley take then if approved as Trustee if

the Government pushes forward on forfeiture

proceedings as to the assets of these debtors?

MR. LODOEN: Your Honor -
THE COURT: I would assume as Trustee

he's going to not want to see that happening

1	because he's supposed to act in accordance with
2	bankruptcy law, but what happens if the
3	Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office
4	goes ahead with it?
5	MR. LODOEN: I think his obligation
6	as a Trustee would be to he would try to keep
7	those assets in the bankruptcy estate.
8	Now, the U.S. Trustee's Office has just
9	suggested and conversing that there may be an
10	issue as to whether any Trustee in a bankruptcy
11	case has standing to resist forfeiture or not,
12	whether that's an issue that the particular
13	creditors of that case have to address. I don't
14	know the answer to that question. We'd have to
15	look at that at that point in time, but I can
16	tell you the first approach of Mr. Kelley would
17	be to try to bring the parties together and come
18	to some type of a consensual resolution of those

19 issues.

20 I know of at least one case before this

21 District where the forfeiture card was pursued

22 and ultimately that case had -- the other parties

23 reached consensus on that particular -- that

24 particular case. Now, it might have been after

25 some briefing, but ultimately the parties came to

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a resolution, so we'll have to -- we'll have to 1 2 deal with that as it comes, but certainly because a Trustee of the bankruptcy case, if he's got the 3 4 ability under the law and the authority to resist it, he would do that as a Trustee. If he doesn't 5 have the authority to resist it then we'd have to 6 7 figure out with the other creditors how that -how that would be fought or objected to, but he's 8 certainly not going to be there waiving a banner 9 and saying, okay, let's forfeit these assets. 10 11 That's not his role. That's the U.S. Attorney's 12 role. THE COURT: All right. I don't think 13 I have any other questions. Thank you. 14 15 MR. LODOEN: All right. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. 16

17	MR. RYAN: Your Honor, may I be heard
18	on this? I am actually here for the Polaroid
19	that is to go at 3:00, but I think Polaroid has
20	come up a number of times.
21	THE COURT: All right. Why don't you
22	come forward and note your appearance. I'm not
23	really sure why I am doing this, but go ahead. I
24	will recognize Mr. Dennis Ryan. Now tell me who
25	you are here for.

MR. RYAN: Yes, as has been 1 mentioned Polaroid is wholly owned by PGW and is 2 it itself in a Chapter 11 case and the Polaroid 3 creditors -- official Creditor's Committee which 4 is appointed by the U.S. Trustee's Office has 5 recently decide to retain the law firm of Paul 6 7 Hastings as General Committee Counsel and the law firm of Faegre & Benson as local counsel in connection with the Polaroid case. 9 We just have been engaged and we're in 10 the process of speaking with Mr. Ridgway and 11 12 filing our applications, but given the inter-relationships of Polaroid as has been 13 mentioned by many people here and the impact of 14

15	the ruling today on Polaroid in the Polaroid
16	case, I think particularly from the Committee
17	perspective addressing the conflict issues that
18	Mr. Lodoen just mentioned and have interchange
19	with the Court would be appropriate for us to
20	comment and I will note having indicated that law
21	firms have been retained contrary to the
22	representation, no other professionals have been
23	retained by the Committee and Polaroid at this
24	point, no financial professionals or anyone else.
25	But if I may, Your Honor, I have with me

1	from the law firm of Paul Hastings Rick thestey
2	who's a partner in the Paul Hastings law firm.
3	He's an '85 graduate of the University of
4	Cincinnati College of Law. He's admitted in Ohio
5	and Illinois, in the Northern District of
6	Illinois, Northern and Southern Districts of
7	Ohio, all of the Circuit Courts except the First
8	in D.C. and I asked him to explain to me sometime
9	why he missed those two, as well as the U.S.
10	Supreme Court and I will be filing a pro hac vice
11	application for him in the Polaroid case, but I
12	ask that he be admitted today just to speak to

13 this issue on Polaroid. 14 THE COURT: I don't really have the 15 to power under the local -- District Court's Local Rule to admit him per se. I will let him 16 preserve some remarks for the record. 17 18 MR. CHESLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: For whatever anomalous 20 effect that has, I am willing to do it. 21 MR. CHESLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 I appreciate your courtesy. I will be extremely 23 brief. 24 THE COURT: Go ahead. 25 MR. CHESLEY: The only points we

1	wanted to raise, Your Honor, were first of all,
2	with respect to the Polaroid committee's
3	retention of financial advisors, we have not
4	retained one nor at this point do we envision
5	filing an application to do so working with the
6	debtors and their financial advisors in an
7	attempt to be as efficient as we can in the
8	Polaroid cases and that's what I wanted to speak
9	to today.
10	I took from the remarks previously the

11	U.S. Trustee's comments with respect to no
12	evidence of prejudice as it relates to Mr. Kelley
13	in his various roles here. Obviously with
14	respect to Polaroid and the unsecured creditors
15	in that case, Your Honor, rest assured we will be
16	ever vigilant in protecting those interests and,
17	in fact, I may not be advancing those interests
18	particularly well today because we may, in fact,
19	find ourselves at logger heads with Mr. Kelley as
20	these cases proceed in parallel with the Polaroid
21	cases, but what was important for us to mention
22	today, obviously is efficiencies and we have
23	heard this from all the stakeholders here today.
24	There's much to do in the Polaroid cases
25	and certainly in the Petters cases and there are

limited resources within which to do it. We are
obviously starting as quickly as we can to move
down our paths and with no evidence of prejudice
as it relates to Mr. Kelley, we think at this
point there's no reason at all to disturb the
decisions that are made by the United States
Trustee and we will continue along our path with
Mr. Kelley in these cases.

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9	We may come back to the Court if issues
10	come up in the future, but this point there's a
11	lot to be done and little time and resource
12	within which to do it.
13	I appreciate Your Honor's courtesy.
14	Thank you.
15	THE COURT: Okay. So noted. All
16	right. Mr. Peterson.
17	MR. PETERSON: I am reluctant to do
18	this considering lateness of the hour, Your
19	Honor. I am the Trustee of Lancelot and Colossus
20	that is five hedge fund estates pending in the
21	United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
22	District of Illinois.
23	I unfortunately am the largest creditor
24	of these estates at 1.3 billion dollars, about
25	five times the size of the Ritchie claims

1	I have read the well written briefs of
2	Ritchie and have listened to the thoughtful
3	remarks of their Counsel, but nevertheless I
4	object to their objection.
5	Three reasons I wish to raise that have
6	not been raised before. Counsel for Ritchie has

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7	suggested that a custodian cannot become a
8	Trustee under our Bankruptcy Code citing the
9	Section 543.
10	On the other hand, Your Honor,
11	Section 321(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that
12	the only person on earth who cannot be a Trustee
13	is the examiner appointed in the case.
14	Now, if Congress meant to exclude
15	custodians from being Trustees, it clearly knew
16	how to do that in Section 321(a) and I would ask
17	the Court to adopt the principal of legislative
18	construction. I will do the latin, it will be
19	awful, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, to
20	state that clearly a custodian by this exclusion
21	in 321(a) is qualified to become a Trustee.
22	No. 2, the Committee raised in it's
23	brief, Your Honor, the decision of the United
24	States Supreme Court in New Hampshire vs. Maine,
25	532 U.S. 742 2001, dealing with the principals of

judicial estoppel. Basically when a party
appears before the first court articulating a
position and obtains relief from that Court, it
cannot come to a second court and argue the

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5	opposite position just because it's tactical
6	position perhaps changed and that is certainly
7	true in the case at bar with respect to their
8	arguments about an internal conflict.
9	They in the brief filed in this Court
10	take the position that there is, in essence, a
11	good Petters and a bad Petters, that when
12	Mr. Petters ran Petters Worldwide he was the
13	prince of light and when he ran PCI he was the
14	prince of darkness.
15	They then go on to state that there are
16	two types of creditors in this estate, victims
17	and non-victims. He then argues that the money
18	in this case is at the PGW level while all the
19	creditors who are victims are at the PCI level,
20	leaving only Ritchie as a creditor of PGW.
21	That's what their pleadings say in
22	essence, but when they went to the Circuit Court
23	in October of 2008, they told quite a different
24	story. Attached to the pleadings that were filed
25	by Mr. Kelley as Exhibit C1 and C2 are their

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Complaint and their Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order. In their Complaint they argue

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3	that they are the victim of a fraud, fraud in the
4	inducement. By their own admissions they too are
5	a victim.
6	No. 2, in their motion, in the very first
7	paragraph, the paragraph used for primacy, they
8	make two interesting observations. No. 1,
9	Mr. Petters was the head of an empire and the
10	Petters empire used in that motion is in a very
11	pejorative context.
12	And then No. 2, they state most telling
13	of all Petters Worldwide was part of that empire.
14	In the pleadings at bar this is the good Petters
15	and PCI is the bad Petters, completely different
16	position.
17	They then go on to ask the Circuit Court,
18	the Honorable Alexander White presiding, to
19	appoint one receiver, Mr. Procida, for both
20	Petters Worldwide and PCI and, in fact, they
21	procure an order where that receiver is
22	appointed.
23	It is my position, Your Honor, as the
24	estates largest creditor that they cannot have
25	their cake and eat it too. They cannot go to the

1	Circuit Court of Cook County and say there is no
2	internal conflict and then come to this Court and
3	say, oh yes, there is because we don't
4	particularly like this receiver, but we love
5	Mr. Procida.
6	My next argument, Your Honor, deals with
7	prejudice and policy. Here I am sitting here as
8	a credit of 1.3 billion dollars. In fact,
9	Ritchie is one of the creditors of my estate and
10	I am trying to get his dividend increased along
11	with everyone else's. If we have the appointment
12	of a Trustee and if you accept their external
13	argument that Mr. Kelley cannot be the receiver
14	and the Trustee, then, Your Honor, I think is
15	forced to appoint two Trustees, one for PCI and
16	one for Petters Worldwide.
17	What does that mean? First of all, in
18	terms of costs, we have Trustees drawing fees.
19	We have Trustees hiring lawyers. We have
20	Trustees hiring financial advisors and God knows
21	who else that they will hire. We may even have
22	separate Creditor's Committees now with them
23	hiring separate lawyers and separate financial
24	advisors. Although the parties earlier talked
25	about costs, they did not talk about the other

ramifications of such an order. 1 2 First of all, are we going to have a problem with races to the courthouse between the 3 4 receiver and the two other Trustees? Are we 5 going to have a danger of inconsistent results? 6 Are we going to have the inefficient use of 7 judicial economy? And most telling are we now 8 going to create tension where one presently does not exist between the U.S. Attorney's Office and 9 the Forfeiture Court versus the Bankruptcy Court. 10 11 At least once in my career in the last two years and twice in Ms. Steege's career, my partner, we 12 13 have worked with the U.S. Attorney in terms of 14 forfeitures where they allow the Trustee to 15 disperse the money that has been forfeited. Why do we want to pick a fight by disqualifying the 16 17 very able Mr. Kelley when we could have an opportunity here to have cooperation with the 18 U.S. Attorney's Office and if there is any 19 forfeited money to be turned over to the Trustee 20 21 for administration, that to me, Your Honor, seems 22 to be the real prejudice if this motion is 23 granted prematurely. 24 Now these issues came up in Chicago now, 25 and I appreciate that what happens in Chicago is

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not binding on Minnesota particularly after what has happened to our Governor, but nevertheless we sat down with this problem and my U.S. Trustee suggested to me that my role in the beginning of this case was to reduce this case to cash, have a pile of money over which to fight and if at that point in time there was so much money and the parties could not agree on how to divide that money, then the U.S. Trustee would consider either appointing special counsel or additional Trustees to sort out who is the proper owner of that money. It is my recommendation to this Court that the primary function of Mr. Kelley at this point in these proceedings is to reduce this estate to cash, to have something over which Mr. Krakauer and I can legitimately fight. That is what he should be doing. Mr. Kelley made a statement that the dividend could be anywhere from zero to 20 cents and I made a comment to my Court that if Mr. Kelley could get a dividend of twenty cents on the dollar I would personally carry him around

this courthouse on my shoulders, an honor that he

may not wish to accept.

1	Nevertheless, Your Honor, if there comes
2	a time in this estate where we have that pile of
3	money sitting on the floor and there's a time
4	when we have to divide that money up between the
5	computing interests, then and only then under
6	Rule 2009(d) should we consider the appointment
7	of either special counsel or additional Trustees
8	to protect those parochial interests, but right
9	now, Your Honor, it is my sense that our goal
10	should be to have one Trustee acting in a unitary
11	manner to reduce this estate to cash so that we
12	have something to fight over.
13	Thank you, Judge.
14	THE COURT: All right. Well, one
15	more round. Mr. Jorissen.
16	MR. JORISSEN: Thank you, Your
17	Honor. I will be very brief. First of all, with
18	respect to Polaroid, I didn't think I had
19	suggested to the Court that Polaroid had retained
20	professionals. I was talking about the
21	Creditor's Committee in this case that had
22	retained professionals and to the extent I
23	created confusion I did not mean to say what

24 apparently I may have said.

On the issue of the single receiver or

1	Ritchie's actions before the District Court
2	initiated the receivership proceedings here, if
3	you look at the exhibit to which they are
4	referring and claiming that there's some sort of
5	judicial estoppel that would work here, the
6	context in which Ritchie brought it's motion for
7	the appointment of a receiver was to take
8	possession to have Mr. Procida take possession
9	of collateral, the collateral consisting of
10	certain notes described in a note and no purchase
11	agreement and I will rely on your Your Honor to
12	look at the exhibit that they have attached to
13	their their pleading, but quite clearly when
14	Ritchie sought the appointment of Mr. Procida,
15	the purpose of getting a receiver in place in
16	that action was to grab collateral in which
17	Ritchie had a security interest. It had nothing
18	to do with whether Mr. Procida would have
19	conflicting interests with respect to PCI and
20	PGW.
21	The United States Trustee's Office,

Mr. Ridgway, argued that he reads and, I'm sorry

I can't remember what the name of the case is, he

reads In Re: Madison Avenue Limited Partnership

as providing that once a bankruptcy case is

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commenced the receivership ceases to exist as a 1 2 matter of law. I don't read Madison Avenue Limited 3 Partnership to say that. I think what that case 4 5 says is that a receiver takes on none of the 6 obligations of a debtor in possession or a Trustee. I think what the law is under Section 7 543 is that what once a bankruptcy case is 8 commenced a receiver as a custodian can take no 9 further action in respect of the administration 10 11 of the assets of the debtor or of the bankruptcy 12 estate, so I don't think that this case says what 13 the U.S. Trustee's Office says it says. 14 I think what it basically says is that in that case the receiver wasn't empowered to act 15 because of the turnover provision and the 16 restraints on the conduct of the receiver under 17 18 Section 543.

Mr. Runck suggested that this Court

should treat the receivership as suspended and I
am not sure how that would work. Judge
Montgomery hasn't terminated the receivership as
it relates to PGW or PCI or any of the other
Petters entities.

Does that mean that we can administer the

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2 the District Court? Could they sell -- for 3 instance, they have announced an intention that 4 it's possible that Polaroid will be subject to a 363 sale in the not too distant future. Does 5 that get done outside the purview of the 6 7 receivership? I don't know, but as I read the receivership order, it certainly seems to me like 8 9 Mr. Kelley would have to go to the judge in the District Court proceeding to -- to obtain 10 11 authority to consummate a sale of that nature. If the --12 THE COURT: Wait a minute now. 13 Polaroid is different though because Polaroid has 14 15 management in place. Mr. Kelley as receiver may 16 have stepped into the shoes of the shareholder, 17 but when you have got management in place they

assets of the bankruptcy estates without going to

18 really are the ones that are empowered to go 19 ahead as debtors in possession. MR. JORISSEN: But I guess the 20 greater point, Your Honor, one, the receivership 21 22 order itself directs Mr. Kelley to take control 23 of the operations of Polaroid and the other 24 affiliated companies. THE COURT: Well, in so far -- I 25

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2 on the receivership order quite yet. I may well have to do that, but I mean the thought there 3 maybe he's taking that asset by virtue of 4 succeeding Tom Petters as shareholder or PGW as 5 shareholder and therefore the action is taken 6 7 through that vector, possibly. 8 I am sort of thinking outloud which is 9 always dangerous, particularly in a hotly 10 contested hearing, but I don't know that it 11 necessarily has to follow and flow the way you're 12 suggesting. 13 MR. JORISSEN: Well, I would just 14 note, Your Honor, that there have been motions 15 for relief from the automatic stay that have been

guess I'd hesitate to really put a construction

16	filed or for relief from stay in the District
17	Court proceeding. Acorn filed one. Zenith filed
18	one. There was another creditor whose name
19	escapes me at this point, but I sat through those
20	proceedings and Judge Montgomery clearly first
21	of all, the debtor or Mr. Kelley as receiver and
22	the United States Attorney both clearly staked
23	out the position in that case that Mr. Kelley was
24	directed to take possession and control of the
25	operations of Polaroid, so there's no and I

1	think that Judge Montgomery herself recognized on
2	the record during that argument that it was her
3	intention, and it may have been in a subsequent
4	order, but I think on the record that it was her
5	intention to include Polaroid and those entities
6	within the ambit of the receivership order.
7	THE COURT: I am going to submit to
8	you though, the U.S. Trustee hasn't moved for the
9	appointment of a receiver in the Polaroid cases.
10	MR. JORISSEN: I understand that.
11	THE COURT: And I am sure that is
12	because in large part there is management there
13	with which counsel can at least confer.

14	Now, maybe the considerations behind the
15	ultimate strategic elections in the case may come
16	from elsewhere, but at the very least there is
17	management on board that's holding the company
18	together, continuing to run it on a day-to-day
19	basis.
20	MR. JORISSEN: No, no. I agree.
21	THE COURT: The longer term prospects
21	·
	THE COURT: The longer term prospects
22	THE COURT: The longer term prospects may well come from other sorts of considerations,

1	MR. JORISSEN: No, no. I think the
2	point though, Your Honor, is that there is no
3	question but that under the terms of that
4	receivership order, at least as I read it and I
5	have been wrong before, but under the terms of
6	that order Mr. Kelley makes the call in the first
7	instance and he does so in consultation with
8	Judge Montgomery for any assets that are under
9	receivership but, you know, I think the more I
10	mean a lot of the issues come up now based on
11	what we have heard today. There's this notion

that the receivership ceased to exist when the order authorizing the appointment of a receiver was entered or alternatively I guess when the U.S. Trustee made it's appointment.

And as to the interim status I am not sure what the interim status was, but as that gap period goes on, now you have got Price Waterhouse Cooper out there doing analysis of transactions which we have heard today will be reported out to everyone and they have done so as engaged by Mr. Kelley at his behest to do that and so they are going to publish a report.

Now, is Mr. Kelley going to be able to

Now, is Mr. Kelley going to be able to come back and surcharge the bankruptcy estates

for the work that's done during this interim
period? Does that make him a creditor of these
Chapter 11 estates? We have heard today the
first time I heard it that affiliates that are
parties in the receivership action are funding
PGW's operations. Now, does that make them
creditors and does that make Mr. Kelley as the
receiver for those entities outside of
bankruptcy, if in fact the receiverships have

been terminated, does that make him a creditor on
behalf of those non-bankruptcy affiliates?
But I think as I read Section 543, what
it says is that a receiver quo custodian once
the bankruptcy cases are commenced, they have no
further authority to act and there's been nothing
to terminate Mr. Kelley's status as a receiver
and I would submit, Your Honor, and I haven't
looked into it directly, but I would submit that
in all probability in many instances after the
commencement of these cases and even after the
order that you issued authorizing the appointment
of a receiver, Mr. Kelley has acted under color
of his authority as receiver to do things
ostensibly for the benefit of PGW, PCI or the
other bankrupt debtors, so it

The law on this issue I don't think says
that simply because the bankruptcy cases are
commenced that the receivership ends or that his
status as receiver is terminated. I think that
543 says you can't act to administer the assets
of the estate and I think that that circumstance
prevents him from serving as Trustee in these

8	cases.			
9	I think that's all I have, Your Honor.			
10	Thank you.			
11	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ridgway,			
12	was there anything else you wanted to note?			
13	MR. RIDGWAY: One moment, Your			
14	Honor.			
15	THE COURT: Sure.			
16	MR. RIDGWAY: Nothing further, Your			
17	Honor.			
18	THE COURT: Okay. Very good.			
19	Mr. Runck, was there anything else you			
20	wanted to note?			
21	MR. RUNCK: No thank you, Your			
22	Honor.			
23	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lodoen?			
24	MR. LODOEN: Your Honor,			
25	Mr. Kelley's understanding, and quite frankly my			

1	understanding, is that the Trustee is different
2	from the debtor in possession where like such as
3	Polaroid his receivership is over that stock
4	interest that that equity interest.
5	In the instance of a Trustee being

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6	appointed, that Trustee just like a normal
7	bankruptcy case has no obligation to the
8	shareholders, doesn't take any direction from the
9	shareholders. The Trustee comes in and it's
10	obligation is as a fiduciary to the Court and to
11	the creditors. If there's something Mr. Kelley
12	needs to do to clarify that, whether it's to seek
13	an order before Judge Montgomery clarifying it,
14	whether it's signing a piece of paper saying I am
15	only the Trustee, I am not I am my role
16	with respect to the receivership is over with
17	respect to those entities, that could be done. I
18	don't see that as a problem because it, in fact,
19	would just reflect what is everybody's
20	understanding I believe in this court, other than
21	perhaps the Ritchie Group.
22	So if that would help the Court suggest
23	what would appropriate and we could I suspect
24	obtain that.
25	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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Anybody else? All right. Very good.

Well, once again I will say I haven't

3 seen one like this before and I have been doing

4 my end of this work almost as long as or longer 5 than a lot of lawyers in this courtroom have. 6 I am going to take this under advisement, Counsel. I feel compelled to put this into a 7 8 written order, which I am going to proceed with 9 all haste on. It's my hope to get that out by 10 the end of next week. 11 I can't absolutely guarantee that, but 12 that would be my hope because this issue does have to be settled here as quickly as possible 13 and frankly given the dimensions of this being 14 15 both very abstract and abstruse, but also very much down to the nitty-gritty, very practically 16 orientated, I think that it would best serve the 17 purposes of attaching integrity to my conclusion 18 19 to set that down in writing, so my staff and I will get to work on that right away and as I say 20 it's my hope to be able to issue that order by 21 22 the end of next week. So I will consider the record as closed 23 24 here and there was more than enough to argue on 25 as a matter of law, which as I ruled last week I

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2	upon the configuration of the parties and				
3	particularly based upon Mr. Kelley's status and				
4	charge and admission as receiver under Judge				
5	Montgomery's order, so I think that should take				
6	care of it, unless anybody else has something				
7	else they want to note for the record in the				
8	context of this case. All right. Good enough.				
9	Mr. Runck?				
10	MR. RUNCK: Your Honor, I just want				
11	to mention, after there's one other motion				
12	technically scheduled to be heard today.				
13	THE COURT: Okay. I am glad you				
14	remembered it. I almost forgot myself, so I				
15	thought I should remind the Court.				
16	THE COURT: There it is on the				
17	calendar, yes. All right. Why don't you just go				
18	ahead and speak to that real quickly.				
19	MR. RUNCK: Okay. Your Honor, very				
20	briefly, this is what was intended to be a very				
21	routine motion. It's a motion to establish				
22	confidentiality procedures for the committee. We				
23	filed the motion approximately two weeks ago.				
24	The purpose of the motion is to clarify				
25	Section 1102(b)(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and				

Ţ	to make it clear that the Committee is not
2	obligated to turn over confidential information
3	to third parties. We have a proposed order that
4	sets forth the procedures that we suggest for
5	dealing with confidential information that the
6	committee receives and the basis for that is set
7	forth in our motion papers.
8	We haven't received any objection to this
9	motion, but I just wanted to bring it to the
10	Court's attention.
11	THE COURT: Okay. Good enough.
12	Anybody have anything they want to note on that?
13	Mr. Ridgway?
14	MR. RIDGWAY: Your Honor, just a
15	technical point, because this is entered into
16	with Mr. Kelley in his role as, quote, Chapter 11
17	Trustee, obviously he hasn't yet been appointed,
18	so with that qualifications we certainly don't
19	have an objection to the content of it, merely
20	with regard to the in limbo status, if you will,
21	of Mr. Kelley and I don't know if that causes the
22	Court any concern. It certainly doesn't in terms
23	of the content and what this motion is all about
24	certainly.
25	THE COURT: Substantively the U.S.

_	riustee s orrice has no objection to that.			
2	MR. RIDGWAY: That's correct.			
3	THE COURT: All right. Well, that			
4	really only affects, I guess, the standing of the			
5	proponents of the measure and I don't think			
6	that's really material given the fact that nobody			
7	has any substantive objection to it, I am going			
8	to go ahead and grant the motion regardless of			
9	whether I would consider it as a product of a			
10	stipulation or a joint motion or just as the			
11	Committee coming forward.			
12	And am I correct in remembering that this			
13	sort of relief is basically necessitated by the			
14	language that was enacted in the 2005 Amendments			
15	Act?			
16	MR. RUNCK: That's correct, Your			
17	Honor. The language of the statute is very broad			
18	and I would argue it implicitly acknowledges that			
19	confidential information is not required to be			
20	disclosed. However, better to be safe than sorry			
21	so we figured we should bring this type of a			
22	motion to make that very clear and to establish a			
23	set procedure for dealing with that type of			
24	information.			
25	THE COURT: You can say an awful lot			

1	of things about what we think Congress implicitly
2	meant in the 2005 legislation, but it's kept an
3	awful lot of us far more busy than we really
4	should have had to be, so good enough. I will
5	see that the order is entered. I am going to
6	grant the motion and that should take care of
7	that.
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103 STATE OF MINNESOTA SS. 2 COUNTY OF DAKOTA 3 4 BE IT KNOWN, THAT I TRANSCRIBED THE 5 TAPE-RECORDED PROCEEDINGS HELD AT THE TIME AND PLACE 6 SET FORTH HEREIN ABOVE; 7 8 THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE RECORDED ELECTRONICALLY AND STENOGRAPHICALLY TRANSCRIBED INTO 9 TYPEWRITING, THAT THE TRANSCRIPT IS A TRUE RECORD OF 10 THE PROCEEDINGS, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY; 11 12 13 THAT I AM NOT RELATED TO ANY OF THE PARTIES HERETO NOR INTERESTED IN THE OUTCOME OF THE 14 15 ACTION; 16 WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL: 17 18 19 S/ LESLIE PINGLEY 20 21

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2	2	LESLIE	PINGLEY
2	3	NOTARY	PUBLIC
2	4		
2	5		